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RACE, TRUST, ALTRUISM, AND RECIPROCITY
George W. Dent, Jr. *

I. INTRODUCTION
Trust, altruism, and reciprocity are attracting growing attention from scholars. Interest began with psychological experiments
showing that people often are altruistic, trust others, and reciprocate the benevolence of others far more than economic models of
Arational@ human selfishness predict.1 These findings inspired social scientists to discover what factors promote or hinder cooperation.2 Legal scholars have employed this learning to determine
how the law does or could facilitate or discourage cooperation in
many contexts, including business transactions and the workplace.3 The influence of race on cooperation has been studied in
specific areas, but so far no one has considered how the new
learning might improve race relations and racial equality. This
article makes an initial effort to do so.
Trust in others is essential to human interaction, especially in
dealings too complex for the parties= rights and duties to be detailed in writing. Trust grows when each side=s contribution is reciprocated by the other=s, but not if reciprocity is withheld. Likewise, trust shrinks rapidly if one party abuses the other=s trust by
acting opportunistically. People often eschew gain and help the
needy; but altruism dwindles if the recipients do not seem truly

* Schott-van den Eyden Professor, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
B.A., 1969; J.D. 1973, Columbia University; LL.M., 1981, New York University.
1. “The empirical challenge to the self-interest hypothesis began in the 1980s when
experimental economists started to study bilateral bargaining games in controlled laboratory settings.” Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1663 (2003).
2. Cf. id. at 1665–65 (discussing the theory of reciprocal fairness).
3. See generally Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757 (2003) (reviewing CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS AND A
NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Franciso Valdes et. al. eds., 2002)).
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needy, do not try to help themselves, or if others who could help
refuse to do so and free ride” on those who are altruistic.
The dearth of racial trust in America is dramatically manifested in the separation so often chosen by both blacks and
whites.4 Distrust blocks cooperation and altruism between the
races and obstructs efforts to solve virtually every social problem.5 Part I of this article reviews the learning about trust, altruism, and reciprocity. Part II applies this knowledge to better understand racial division and inequality in America, and why
many policies and positions do not ameliorate these ills and indeed may exacerbate them. Part III discusses our goals in race relations, Part IV prescribes principles to foster interracial trust,
and Part V proposes some specific steps to reduce racial inequality while building trust.
II. TRUST, ALTRUISM, NORMS, AND LAW
A. Trust, Fairness, and Reciprocity
The social sciences long assumed that people act only from material self-interest and are suspicious of others.6 Accordingly, it
was assumed that an individual transacts with another only
when, by his own actions, or by invoking the law, he can avoid
any noncooperation or opportunism of the other that would deny
him the material gain he expects from the transaction.7
If true, these assumptions pose many problems. First, no one
entering a contract completely foregoes trust and relies solely on
self-help or enforcement; no one contracts with someone who
swears to cheat whenever it suits him to do so.8 Further, even
simple exchanges involve too many contingencies to be fully covered in a contract: A[a]ll contracts are incomplete.@9 This is particularly true in complex transactions. The paradigm is marriage,

4. See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION
PROSPERITY 295–305 (1995) (discussing levels of trust within several American ethnic
groups).
5. Id.
6. A[E]conomic analysis generally begins by assuming that people behave like homo
economicus—that they are perfectly rational and purely self-interested actors.@ Lynn A.
Stout, On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don’t Want to Invite
Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (2003).
7. See id.
8. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 4, at 25.
9. Scott, supra note 1, at 1641.
OF
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which entails so much interaction that no contract, however long,
could begin to specify the rights and duties of the spouses. The
same is true of intricate business deals, like joint ventures. Written contracts are insufficient where it is hard to monitor the other
party=s performance and to prove a breach to a court, as when a
party promises its best efforts over a long time in a complex project.10
A low level of trust suffices for the many contracts where the
parties need not work together after agreement is reached. Even
in a complex exchange, like a corporate merger, major terms can
be spelled out adequately and the threat of legal enforcement
largely deters opportunism.11 Deeper cooperation is possible only
because the model of homo economicus is false; people often interact on a basis of trust and benefit by so doing.12 People who
trust achieve Asubstantially higher levels of efficiency in their
transactions.@13 For this reason many employers cultivate trust in
the workplace.14 Trust reduces transaction costs: Athere is less
need to spell things out in lengthy contracts; less need to hedge
against unexpected contingencies; fewer disputes, and less need
to litigate if disputes arise.@15 Conversely, “where trust is gone . . .
the agency costs incurred by the team members—the costs of mutual monitoring if you will—are likely to increase.”16 Benefits flow
from cooperation. In “a carefully worked out relationship one gets
performance only to the letter of the contract,”17 whereas in a

10. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms, 31 J.L. & ECON. 265, 267–68 (1988). A fully specified contract may
be impractical because Aperformance may be prohibitively costly to measure and to specify
in a way that contractual breach and the extent of damages can be proven to the satisfaction of the court.@ Id. at 267–68; see also Ilya Segal, Complexity and Renegotiation: A
Foundation for Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 57, 58 (1999) (stating that contracts tend to be less complete when the transaction is more complex).
11. SEE JORDAN D. LEWIS, TRUSTED PARTNERS, HOW COMPANIES BUILD MUTUAL
TRUST AND WIN TOGETHER 261–64 (1999).
12. See generally Stout, supra note 6, at 12 (“Social dilemma experiments accordingly
demonstrate, rather conclusively, that people often behave altruistically.”).
13. Ernst Fehr & John A. List, The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives—Trust
and Trustworthiness Among CEO=s 1, 17 (manuscript Nov. 2002); see also FUKUYAMA, supra note 4, at 151 (cataloging the benefits of trust).
14. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 3, at 1789.
15. FUKUYAMA, supra note 4, at 151.
16. Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust and Team Production in Post-Capitalist Society, 24 J.
CORP. L. 869, 870 (1999).
17. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,
28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 64 (1963). The process of negotiating a contract may itself undermine
trust and cooperation. See supra note 10. Therefore, parties often forego contracts altogether. This is typical in marriage. It is also done in some business deals. See LEWIS, supra
note 11, at 263.
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transaction based on trust, both sides may contribute more than
the minimum required by their contract.18
Trust works because most people do not conform to the model
of narrow material selfishness.19 Most people value “fairness and
reciprocity.”20 Thus, in games in psychological experiments where
a player may choose either to keep an entire sum of money or to
share with other players, most people share.21 Most people also
reciprocate the fairness of others, “reward[ing] generous . . . offers
with generous efforts (even when it is costly for them to do so).”22
Unfairness is also reciprocated. People who feel mistreated
usually retaliate even if they know that retaliation will be costly
for them.23 People judge others less from the effects of their actions than from their apparent intentions: “It is not what happens
in relations so much as how that is interpreted, and how people
infer and attribute competencies and motives to people that matters, in the formation or destruction of trust.”24 A person=s willingness to trust and be fair is not the same in all circumstances
and for all other people; it depends on context and the identity of
the other. “Social capital”—that is, “social networks and the
norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from
them”25—varies from culture to culture.26 Social capital promotes

18. See LEWIS, supra note 11, at 163–64.
19. See Stout, supra note 6, at 11–12.
20. Scott, supra note 1, at 1662.
21. See generally Robyn M. Dawes & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Cooperation, 2 J.
ECON. PERSP. 187, 192–95 (1988) (discussing altruism); Robyn M. Dawes et al., Cooperation for the Benefit of Us—Not Me, or My Conscience, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 108–10
(Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990) (discussing experiments supporting group-identity hypothesis); Robyn M. Dawes, Social Dilemmas, 31 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 169, 182–88 (1980)
(reviewing dilemma games studies); David Sally, Conversation and Cooperation in Social
Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis of Experiments from 1958 to 1992, 7 RATIONALITY & SOC=Y 58,
68 (1995).
22. Scott, supra note 1, at 1664.
23. See George Loewenstein, Emotions in Economic Theory and Economic Behavior,
90 AM. ECON. REV. 426, 429–30 (2000); Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game
Theory and Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281, 1284 (1993). An emotionally based commitment to retaliate even at (short-term) cost to oneself and an ability to signal this (i.e.,
to warn others) may help to deter mistreatment by others. See ROBERT H. FRANK,
PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS 2 (1988).
24. BART NOOTEBOOM, TRUST: FORMS, FOUNDATIONS, FUNCTIONS, FAILURES AND
FIGURES 24 (2002); see also Scott, supra note 1, at 1666 (stating Athe key is how a person
interprets the actions of the other party@).
25. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY 19 (2000).
26. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 4, at 25–26; Joseph Henrich et al., In Search of Homo
Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies, 91 M. ECON. REV. 73,
76–77 (2001). To some extent, however, the tendency to reward cooperation and generosity
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economic growth; in nations with high social capital people can
more easily enter into the complex transactions that are crucial to
growth in this era of advanced technology and global competition.27
Trust also varies among subgroups.28 People “tend to gravitate
toward what is familiar and predictable [and] . . . to shy away
from and mistrust what is different.”29 “[P]rejudice may have evolutionary roots, having developed as a quick, crude way for early
humans to protect themselves from danger.”30 How one classifies
others as similar or different, however, is influenced by one=s society: distinctions of clan, tribe, nationality, race, and religion
may or may not be considered to render another person too different to be trusted. Social trust can also arise, though, from “the establishment of a civic consciousness, that is, on strong evaluations based on a shared tradition of civic engagement.”31
Group identity is not always firmly fixed and may even Abe
transiently delineated through a flip of a coin.@32 Thus in a gym
class students will work hard for their team to beat the other
team, even when teams are picked at random. Cooperation is also
and to retaliate against unfairness seems to be biologically programmed. See generally
ALEXANDER J. FIELD, ALTRUISTICALLY INCLINED? THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES,
EVOLUTIONARY THEORY, AND THE ORIGINS OF RECIPROCITY 10 (2001) (concerning “fundamental aspects of human nature, and . . . the attempts by economists and other social scientists to identify its essential features and explore its implications”). Reciprocity that is
not economically self-serving at the individual level may be beneficial at the group level.
Cf. id at 93–94; ELLIOTT SOBER & DAVID SLOAN WILSON, UNTO OTHERS: THE EVOLUTION
AND PSYCHOLOGY OF UNSELFISH BEHAVIOR 6 (1998) (“explor[ing] the concepts of altruism
and selfishness in evolutionary biology, psychology, and philosophy.”).
27. Social capital affects Athe ability of people to work together for common purposes
in groups and organizations.@ FUKUYAMA, supra note 4, at 10. AThe ability to associate depends, in turn, on the degree to which communities share norms and values. . . . Out of
such shared values comes trust, and trust . . . has a large and measurable economic value.@
Id.; see also James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM. J.
SOC., S95, S104–05, S116–17 (Supp. 1988).
28. See generally FUKUYAMA, supra note 4, at 295-306 (discussing levels of trust
within several American ethnic groups).
29. LEE GARDENSWARTZ & ANITA ROWE, DIVERSE TEAMS AT WORK: CAPITALIZING ON
THE POWER OF DIVERSITY 63 (2003); see also GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF
PREJUDICE 4, 19 (1954); VINCY FON & FRANCESCO PARISI, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW, THE LIMITS OF RECIPROCITY FOR SOCIAL COOPERATION 22 (2003) at
http://www.law.gmu.edu/faculty/papers/docs/03-08.pdf (last visited _______) (stating that
“behavioral patterns of reciprocity tend to emerge in close-knit environments with homogeneous players, but do not thrive in highly heterogeneous groups”).
30. Nancy Wartik, Hard-Wired for Prejudice? Experts Examine Human Response to
Outsiders, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2004, at F5 (reporting on conclusions of recent studies
linking prejudice with evolution).
31. ADAM B. SELIGMAN, THE PROBLEM OF TRUST 78 (1997).
32. Sally, supra note 21, at 68.
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influenced by authority. Thus participants in experimental games
are more cooperative if the organizers tell them to be so.33 Sometimes an industry is dominated by one group partly because of
high levels of trust among members of the group.34 Subgroup cohesion, however, can either enhance or undermine solidarity in
the broader society.35
Some techniques for creating trust and empathy are matters of
common sense. To befriend a new neighbor it is self-evident that
one should be friendly, look for common interests, show trust in
the neighbor (as by lending a tool or utensil), and cooperate in
solving mutual problems. The task is more difficult when the parties are diverse, especially if there is a history of distrust between
them.36 Methods have been identified to nurture trust and empathy in difficult situations ranging from troubled marriages to
strategic alliances between businesses from different industries
or nations.
Trust is influenced by the Aamalgam of signals we receive about
such matters as what other people expect, what other people need,
and what other people are likely to do.@37 We have more trust in
those who share our values.38 Trust inspires trust; we tend to
trust people we perceive to be trusting, but A[s]ignals of mistrust
breed mistrust.@39 Similarly, Aif people receive signals that they
are not trusted, they are likely to become less trustworthy.@40 We
trust those whom we know from experience to be trustworthy.41

33. A[P]articipants appear to follow instructions ordering them to cooperate or compete.@ Sally, supra note 21, at 78. This is Aslightly bewildering to an economist, because the
instruction to cooperate does not change the stated payoffs of the game.@ Id.
34. See Donald McCloskey, Bourgeois Virtue, AM. SCHOLAR, Spring 1994, at 177, 183–
84 (explaining that exchange is often focused within an ethnic group because of trust).
35. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 4, at 159 (stating that A[working] class solidarity deepens the divisions between management and labor in Britain@).
36. See id. at 295–96.
37. Stout, supra note 6, at 13.
38. AAs a general rule, trust arises when a community shares a set of moral values in
such a way as to create expectations of regular and honest behavior.@ FUKUYAMA, supra
note 4, at 153; see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
39. Tamar Frankel, Trusting and Non-Trusting on the Internet, 81 B.U. L. REV. 457,
459 (2001). APeople who distrust the motives of others tend to have more rigid and narrow
expectations and to provoke the very reactions they fear.@ John G. Holmes & John K.
Rempel, Trust in Close Relationships, in CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS 187, 190 (Clyde Hendrick
ed., 1989). Conversely, Athose who are more willing to trust other people are likely to be
equally trustworthy in that they are less likely to lie, cheat, or steal.@ David Good, Individuals, Interpersonal Relations, and Trust, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING
COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 3, 32 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988).
40. Tamar Frankel & Wendy J. Gordon, Introduction, 81 B.U. L. REV. 321, 322 (2001).
41. See Thomas Gautschi, History Effects in Social Dilemma Situations, 12
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Trust builds slowly but erodes quickly.42 Once mistrust
emerges it is difficult to reverse:
[M]istrust tends to feed upon itself even more than trust does.
(Mis)trust by X tends to engender (mis)trust on the part of Y, which
justifies and deepens X=s (mis)trust. While trust can be falsified because it leads to reliance on others that can be disappointed, mistrust cannot, because it blocks trusting action that might disprove
43
it.

People can work consciously to create mutual trust.44 Trust
grows with familiarity, so people can build trust just by socializing.45 Communications of good will increase cooperation.46 Being
friendly, however, complicates exchange relationships. Each
party has an incentive to bargain hard for favorable terms. Thus
in negotiating a sale—of a car, a house, or a business—each side
usually seeks the best terms for itself and neither may care what
the other thinks of it after the deal closes.47 In such cases aggressive negotiating tactics—stating extreme demands, belittling the
other side=s concerns and requests, insistence on one=s legal
rights, fighting tooth and nail on many issues, and making
threats—are considered profitable.48 This is especially so for lawyers, who are trained to treat litigation as the paradigm for interaction.49 A reputation for pugnacity is often an asset; it encourages the other side to lower its expectations.50
When parties must cooperate, these tactics can backfire.51 Even

RATIONALITY & SOC=Y 131, 132 (2000); EUGENE BARDACH, GETTING AGENCIES TO WORK
TOGETHER: THE PRACTICE AND THEORY OF MANAGERIAL CRAFTSMANSHIP 256 (1998); see
JUDITH INNES ET AL., COORDINATING GROWTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
THROUGH CONSENSUS BUILDING x (1994).
42. See NOOTEBOOM, supra note 24, at 2.
43. Id. at 89. This effect operates on groups as well as individuals. See Dan M. Kahan,
The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71, 72
(2003) (referring to a “self-sustaining atmosphere of trust”).
44. See LEWIS, supra note 11, at 3–18 (discussing ways to build trust).
45. See BARDACH, supra note 41, at 256–59 (stating that familiarity usually enhances
trust).
46. Sally, supra note 21, at 69–70, 80, 83.
47. But see LEWIS, supra note 11, at 40–41.
48. Id.
49. See George W. Dent, Jr., Lawyers and Trust in Business Alliances, 58 BUS. LAW.
45, 53, 58–59 (2002).
50. Id. at 58.
51. APressing the other firm to retreat, or making implied threats, lowers people=s enthusiasm and causes them to withhold information and protect their interests.@ LEWIS,
supra note 11, at 45; see also Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Foreword: Business
Lawyers and Value Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (1995) (calling the desire
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if they reach agreement, they will distrust each other. Each side
must then spend more time and effort to monitor the other than it
would if they trusted each other. Each will press its legal rights to
the limit and contribute only what it must in order to avoid sanctions that would cost more than the effort needed to avoid the
sanctions.52 This is especially true if one side considers the agreement unfair. In handling the unforeseen problems that plague all
complex transactions the parties will fail utterly to make mutually beneficial adjustments or, at best, will need difficult, expensive negotiations to make such adjustments.53 In short, the relationship each party will gain is less than it could have had with
trust and cooperation.
It is difficult to strike the perfect balance between pursuing for
one=s own interests and promoting trust. One can be too trusting
and concede too much. On the other hand, it is tempting for a
stronger party to impose a one-sided bargain on the weaker. That
ploy can be self-defeating, however, because it provokes resentment in the weaker party, who may retaliate when performing
under the agreement, even at cost to itself.54
There are methods for building trust without sacrificing vital
interests. People more readily accept plans that they have helped
to create;55 they are less cooperative if they feel disrespected.56 It
helps if each party determines which terms of the relationship
are vital to it and is flexible on matters of less importance.57 It
also helps for each party to explain why it needs a particular
term; trust erodes when one side cannot understand the demands
of the other.58 It helps if parties freely share information. Trust
grows when each side feels it is fully informed and that the other

of each side to maximize its own profit a pitfall in bargaining).
52. LEWIS, supra note 11, at 44–45.
53. See id. at 39–40.
54. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing the tendency to retaliate).
Japanese firms often negotiate to build trusting relationships, not to gain one-sided terms.
See Darin Bifani, Win the Battle or Build a Relationship?, How Japanese Style Could Help
American Negotiatosr, BUS. LAW TODAY, May/June 2003, at 25–26.
55. See Kahan, supra note 43, at 20.
56. See ELIJAH ANDERSON, STREETWISE: RACE, CLASS, AND CHANGE IN AN URBAN
COMMUNITY 202–03 (1990); Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Model
of Social Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 361, 369, 384, 389 (2001).
57. See ANDERSON, supra note 56.
58. See Joel Brockner & Phyllis Siegel, Understanding the Interaction Between Procedural and Distributive Justice: The Role of Trust, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS
OF THEORY AND RESEARCH 390, 391 (Roderick M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996) (discussing interorganizational trust) [hereinafter TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS]. “[P]rocedural
justice positively influences trust.” Id. at 402.
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does not conceal information. Each side can earn trust by proposing solutions that expand the total pie so that both sides are winners.59
Since we trust those who share our values, each side can show
the other its commitment to certain values.60 Trustworthiness
and commitment to shared norms can be attested by third parties. We have greater trust in a new restaurant if it has received
good reviews. Many individuals, businesses, and organizations
work hard to build and maintain good reputations because they
know that reputation is a basis for trust.61 The best basis for trust
is that in past dealings another has vindicated our trust. By definition, though, trust entails risk. Therefore, in extending trust
people tend Ato proceed in small steps that yield little risk.@62 AAs
partners fulfill their exchange obligations, cooperation rises to
higher levels.@63
Trust can exist between organizations as well as individuals.64
Thus a company engaged in or exploring a joint venture can earn
the trust of another firm by showing its commitment to honesty,
openness, cooperation, fulfillment of promises, and such; in short,
by the same methods by which one individual earns the trust of

59. Margaret A. Neale & Max H. Bazerman, Perspectives for Understanding Negotiation: Viewing Negotiation as a Judgmental Process, 29 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 33, 40 (1985)
(calling this approach Aintegrative bargaining@); see also JAMES C. FREUND, SMART
NEGOTIATING: HOW TO MAKE GOOD DEALS IN THE REAL WORLD 21–22 (1992).
60. See Jörg Sydow, Understanding the Constitution of Interorganizational Trust, in
TRUST WITHIN AND BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONS: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES AND EMPRICAL
APPLICATIONS 31, 38 (Christel Lane & Reinhard Bachmann eds., 1998) (referring to building trust by the Asignalling of shared assumptions and understandings at the very beginning. Competence, benevolence, and integrity, which are assumed to be important antecedents of trustworthiness on an interpersonal level . . . should have a similar effect at the
interorganizational level, as long as those characteristics are attributed to the organization . . . . in question@).
61. See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1745-62 (2001)
(discussing the importance of commercial reputation in building trust in the cotton industry).
62. NOOTEBOOM, supra note 24, at 90. Initially, the parties may employ “safeguards,”
such as “contracts, supervision, dependence, hostages [and] reputation.” Id. As trust
grows, these safeguards may be dropped.
63. Rachel E. Kranton, The Formation of Cooperative Relationships, 12 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 214, 227 (1996); see also Walter W. Powell, Trust-Based Forms of Governance, in
TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 58, at 51, 60 (AThe process is iterative—the level of
cooperation increases with each agreement between the same partners . . . .@).
64. See generally TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 58; TRUST WITHIN AND
BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONS: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES AND EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS (Christel
Lane & Reinhard Bachmann eds., 1998) (compiling discussions of conceptional issues and
theories of interorganizational trust).
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another. Trust can also extend to more amorphous institutions
like government or securities markets.65 Those who trust government to be honest and fair are less likely to resist its acts or to
violate the law than are those who do not trust government.66
Behavior and attitudes that build trust—friendliness, openness, flexibility, and generosity—do not come naturally to many
people, especially where there is already conflict and mistrust between the parties. Again, this is natural because trust entails
making oneself vulnerable and hence is dangerous. Natural selection weeds out those who trust too much.67
B. Altruism
People have a tendency to act altruistically, that is, with an inclination to help those who need help even if no equal material
consideration is expected in return. This tendency, too, varies
among individuals and among cultures and depends heavily on
context. People are more generous to those they consider to be
like themselves.68 Although by definition altruism precludes material reciprocation, donors generally expect gratitude. Most want
recipients to be deserving in that their needs cannot be met by
their own efforts and do not stem from their own misconduct.69
They also want recipients to make good use of help received.70

65. See PIOTR SZTOMPKA, TRUST: A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 43–44 (1999) (discussing
Atrust directed at institutions and organizations@); Lynn A. Stout, The Investor Confidence
Game, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 407, 426–30 (2002) (discussing trust behavior in the stock market).
66. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 170, 178 (1990). Several studies
examine this phenomenon with regard to the siting of hazardous waste facilities. See
Robin Gregory et al., Incentives Policies to Site Hazardous Waste Facilities, 11 RISK
ANALYSIS 667, 672 (1991); Howard Kunreuther et al., Public Attitudes Toward Siting a
High-Level Nuclear Waste Repository in Nevada, 10 RISK ANALYSIS 469, 480 (1990); Howard Kunreuther & Doug Easterling, The Role of Compensation in Siting Hazardous Facilities, 15 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 601, 601–05 (1996).
67. See SOBER & WILSON, supra note 26, at 3.
68. See Harvey A. Hornstein, The Influence of Social Models on Helping, in ALTRUISM
AND HELPING BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF SOME ANTECEDENTS AND
CONSEQUENCES 29, 31–36 (J. Macaulay & L. Berkowitz eds., 1970) (presenting study
showing that altruism is more likely to the extent that there is a similarity or relationship
between the potential donor and donee).
69. See Leonard Berkowitz, Social Norms, Feelings, and Other Factors Affecting Helping and Altruism, in 6 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 63, 104 (Leonard
Berkowitz ed., 1972) (APeople are much more willing to aid someone requiring assistance
because of factors beyond his control than a person whose dependency is his own fault.@).
70. See NANCY EISENBERG, ALTRUISTIC EMOTION, COGNITION, AND BEHAVIOR 198–99
(1986) (stating that expected utility influences altruism); Shalom H. Schwartz & Judith A.
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However, altruistic inclinations are diminished by Aundue pressure or manipulativeness on the part of the person seeking
help.@71
Altruism is also affected by the conduct of other potential donors. People want others who are able to donate to do so, to make
an equal sacrifice; many people are altruistic if others pitch in but
not if they think others are free-riding—that is, sharing the benefit that accrues to all society from help to the needy while refusing to contribute themselves.72
C. Law and Norms
Like social scientists, legal scholars long assumed that people
are selfish;73 hence the law need only provide the right material
incentives in order to induce desired behavior. Although material
incentives matter and are often potent, they are not the sole determinants of behavior. People often act against their own best
interests. They eat unhealthful diets and, of greater significance
to the law, many people repeatedly commit crimes even though
the odds of eventually being caught and suffering severe penalties
(both legal and social) are very high. Thus material incentives
created by law may have little effect. Severity of penalties, for example, has little impact on the amount of street crimes.74
Societies must often rely on obedience to the law by most citizens even when it is not in their interest to obey. For example, for
many kinds of tax cheating the risk of being caught is low. The
law must depend on voluntary compliance because it is too costly

Howard, Internalized Values as Motivators of Altruism, in DEVELOPMENT AND
MAINTENANCE OF PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE
MORALITY 229, 236 (Ervin Staub et al. eds., 1984) (stating that altruistic behavior is less
likely when potential donors believe that help Awould not be effective”).
71. Shalom H. Schwartz, Normative Influences on Altruism, in 10 ADVANCES
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 221, 264 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1977); Berkowitz,
supra note 69, at 105 (discussing a study showing college students more likely to help
someone in need if they felt free to refuse aid than if they felt compelled to help).
72. See EDWARD O. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY: THE NEW SYNTHESIS 114, 120–21 (2000);
Dawes, Social Dilemmas, supra note 21, at 182–88 (reviewing many studies finding that
people are more likely to cooperate if they think others will cooperate); Robert L. Trivers,
The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 35, 35–39, 45–54 (1971).
73. See WILSON, supra note 72, at 117–18.
74. Cf. Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the TwentyFirst Century, in 23 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1, 21 (Michael Tonry ed.,
1998) (explaining that people do not perceive social and economic costs of punishment to
be strictly proportional to punishment received).
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to audit more than a small percentage of tax returns.75 Finally, in
order to thrive, society, especially a democracy, needs far more
civic activism than is induced by self-interest. Even the minimal
civic act of voting is not in a citizen=s self-interest; since the odds
are small that one vote will alter the result of an election, the effort required to vote exceeds the likely benefit. A fortiori, it does
not serve one=s self-interest to undertake civic or charitable activities.
Material incentives can even backfire. A person inclined to act
out of altruism may come to view the act in terms of self-interest
if offered a reward for so doing. She may then find the incentive
too small and decide not to act.76 Also, many people act altruistically if others do likewise.77 One who learns that others are being
paid for their civic efforts may demand equal pay or simply drop
the activity despite an offer of pay. Coercion can also backfire.
People who are inclined to act voluntarily may become resentful
and refuse to perform an act if told that they are required to do
it.78 AIt would be a mistake, though, to conclude that material incentives invariably diminish trust. . . . [T]he situation will likely
be different if individuals start out with the belief that most other
individuals are inclined to shirk or free-ride. . . . [t]he advent of a
credible reward or penalty can work . . . .@79 Thus the effect of incentives varies with context.
75. See Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical
Analysis, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 323, 334 (1972); FRANK A. COWELL, CHEATING THE
GOVERNMENT: THE ECONOMICS OF EVASION 73–74 (1990); Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin,
The Criminal Deterrence Literature: Implications for Reserach on Taxpayer Compliance, in
2 TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE: SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 126, 142 (Jeffrey A. Roth & John
T. Scholz eds., 1989).
76. As stated by Professor Kahan:
The simple existence of an incentive scheme can be seen as a cue that other
individuals are not inclined to cooperate voluntarily . . . . This inference can
in turn trigger a reciprocal disposition to withhold voluntary cooperation . . . .
In addition, the existence of incentives can mask voluntary contributions to
public goods, thereby diluting the power of such contributions to trigger reciprocal cooperation. Relatedly, incentives can crowd out dispositions such as
altruism by extinguishing the the opportunity of individuals to demonstrate
(to themselves and to others) that they are willing to sacrifice material gain
for the public good.
Kahan, supra note 43, at 76–77
77. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
78. People respond more positively when they are treated “in a civil rather than a coercive fashion.” DAN M. KAHAN, YALE LAW SCHOOL JOHN M. OLIN CENTER FOR STUDIES IN
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY, THE LOGIC OF RECIPROCITY: TRUST COLLECTIVE
ACTION AND LAW 25 (2002), at http://lsr.nellco.org/yale/lepp/papers/281 (last visited
________) (rev. version available at 102 MICH. L. REV. 71 (2003)). Coercion Aactually undermines the incentive that individuals have to collaborate with each other.@ Id. at 26.
79. Kahan, supra note 43, at 77.
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Voluntary civic activity and compliance with law therefore depend not only on material incentives but on norms. Recently
“[l]egal scholars have rediscovered social norms.”80 There must be
“a cultural infrastructure of social norms, learned dispositions to
respect property and keep promises and pay taxes and refrain
from private violence to settle disputes, and of a certain degree of
mutual trust—confidence that others will, within limits, for the
most part, also respect the norms.”81
Norms operate in two ways.
One is that individuals have internal incentives . . . namely, they will
feel virtuous if they adhere to them, and experience guilt if they do
not. Second, individuals have external incentives to obey moral notions in that they will be praised by others for that behavior and ad82
monished, scolded, or otherwise punished for immoral behavior.

Norms are shaped by many forces, such as family, neighborhood, and religion. Law and government are less decisive but do
play a role, especially in the long term. Material incentives matter,83 so taxing or penalizing certain acts tends to reduce their frequency, while conduct that is subsidized tends to increase. Again,
however, material incentives sometimes backfire.
Government also shapes norms through education. Opposition
to moral education in public schools is waning now, partly because of the realization that all education promotes some norms.84
In addition to formal schooling, government educates through
publicity, as by giving or requiring consumer goods to disclose
health and nutrition information. Since trust and altruism tend
to be reciprocated, government can encourage these traits by publicity.85 Publicity is important not only because citizens lack in-

80. AMITAI ETZIONI, THE MONOCHROME SOCIETY 163 (2001). For further relevant literature, see id. at 285–86 n.2.
81. Robert W. Gordon, Why Lawyers Can=t Just Be Hired Guns, in ETHICS IN
PRACTICE: LAWYERS’ ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 42, 44 (Deborah L.
Rhode ed., 2000). Similarly “a social order based on laws can be maintained without massive coercion only if most people most of the time abide, as a result of supportive social
norms, by the social tenets embedded in the law. . . .” ETZIONI, supra note 80, at 171. For
further discussion on the intesection of law and morals, see id. at 155–59.
82. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 604 (2004).
83. See supra text accompanying notes 76–79.
84. “A major goal of education . . . is to foster internalization of social norms by children and thus to affect their preferences.” ETZIONI, supra note 80, at 176. “Public schools
typically foster, despite recent tendencies to deny this fact, a long list of values . . . .” Id. at
196.
85. See Kahan, supra note 43, at 102 (stating that government can encourage Good
Samaratanism “through public commendations of individuals who engage in heroic behavior”).
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formation but also because in processing information “people rely
on a limited number of heuristic principles” that can “lead to severe and systematic errors.”86 For example, A[p]eople care about
fairness, but their judgments about fairness are systematically
biased in their own direction . . . .@87
Finally, government influences norms through the expressive
function of law. As well as providing material incentives, law is
an expression of authority that most people respect.88 Despite
wide skepticism about politics in America now, there is an Aincreasing tendency to look to law as an expression and carrier of
the few values that are widely shared in our society.@89 Many battles are fought over the symbolism of law. Thus there was fierce
debate over the constitutionality and fairness of criminal sodomy
laws even though they were rarely enforced in the few states that
had them.90 Both sides cared about these laws because of their
moral condemnation of homosexual acts.91 Many legislative resolutions are declarations with no practical effect and are sought by
some group solely for symbolic purposes.
The impact of law on norms is negligible when it clashes with
deeply ingrained attitudes. When people are conflicted over competing values, though, law can be influential. People are also affected by the attitudes of those they consider their peers. When
the law promotes norms embraced by many citizens, the two together can alter the attitudes (or at least the behavior) of dissenters.92 When law takes one side on an issue on which many citizens are ambivalent, it can precipitate “norm cascades@ in which
social consensus changes rapidly.93

86. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124 (1974).
87. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, CHICAGO PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER NO.
33, HAZARDOUS HEURISTICS 21 (2002), at http://law.uchicago.edu/academics/publiclaw/
resources/33.crs.hazardous.pdf (last visited ____) (rev. version available at 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 751 (2003)).
88. See Chris Guthrie, Insights from Cognitive Psychology, 54 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 42, 45
(2004) (stating that “we tend to defer to those whom we perceive to be authority figures”).
89. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 3 (1991).
90. See generally Christopher R. Leslie, Lawrence v. Texas as the Perfect Storm, 38 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 509, 511–16 (2005).
91. Id.
92. See SHAVELL, supra note 82, at 618 (stating that the law can lend authority to
norms expressed by private individuals and groups).
93. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 87, at 8. Professor Kahan expresses the same idea in
referring to “multiple equilibria punctuated by tipping points.” KAHAN, supra note 78 at 5.
That is, an increase (or decrease) in the contributions of a few to collective goods can start
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If conditions are not ripe for a norm cascade, the expressive use
of law may help to create such conditions. If broad support for a
norm is lacking, attempts to establish that norm by coercion may
be frustrated: “police grow more reluctant to arrest, prosecutors
to charge, juries to convict, and judges to punish.”94 This problem
can be avoided if lawmakers apply “gentle nudges” rather than
“hard shoves”95 to punish people more receptive to the desired
norm. Merely labeling an act as criminal may persuade people
that it is socially harmful.96 If that happens, lawmakers can then
make greater use of coercive law.
D. Law and Trust
Like the relationship between law and norms, the relationship
between law and trust is complicated. People inclined to cooperate voluntarily may bridle if subjected to legal compulsion to do
so. Thus in business deals cooperation is often greater when parties rely on informal understandings and good faith rather than
on enforcing detailed contracts to the letter.97 Because coercion
can backfire, legal scholars disagree about laws that mandate behavior to help others or impose liability for supposed misconduct
in relationships of trust. ALegalizing@ a relationship may impair
its benefits by introducing fear of legal liability.98 It may also suppress some people=s cooperative inclinations.99 However, lack of
a “chain reaction” pushing the larger group over a tipping point, moving the group willingness to contribute to a higher (or lower) equilibrium. Id. at 9.
94. Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 607–08 (2000).
95. Id. at 608.
96. See JOHANNES ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 7–8 (1974) (discussing
the general effects of criminal punishment on society).
97. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
98. Fear of liability may deter a party from revealing information or admitting error
as a step toward reconciliation. Roy J. Lewicki & Barbara Benedict Bunker, Developing
and Maintaining Trust in Work Relationships, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 58,
at 114, 128–36 (discussing steps required to repair broken trust). Hence, physicians claim
that they often treat patients not as they think is best for the patient but in order to reduce their risk of malpractice liability. ________. The low standard of care for corporate
directors is often defended on the ground that a higher standard would make directors excessively cautious. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power:
Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1663–70 (2001)
(providing overview of duty of care).
99. See Bruno S. Frey, How Intrinsic Motivation Is Crowded Out and In, 6
RATIONALITY & SOC=Y 334 (1994); Bruno S. Frey, Institutions and Morale: The CrowdingOut Effect, in ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND ORGANIZATION 437, 439–42 (Avner Ben-Ner &
Louis Putterman eds., 1998). Others argue that the expressive use of law can promote cooperation. See Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens?: An Economic Analysis
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legal recourse may deter people from trusting others. In many
countries, for example, investment in public companies is low because law offers no relief to investors abused by breaches of
trust.100
Similarly, there is debate whether the expansion of individual
rights in America during the 1960s and 1970s weakened Acommunal institutions@ that long inculcated important social
norms.101 Some think the rights revolution damaged America, in
part by diverting political issues to the courts and away from democratic institutions where negotiation, compromise and coalition-building bring disparate groups together and teach them to
cooperate.102 An excellent example is the debate over abortion. In
America, one side asserts the right to life of the unborn child,
while the other asserts the pregnant woman=s right to control her
body.103 Both are absolute positions that preclude compromise
and lead to endless acrimony.104 By contrast, in Europe the debate
remains in the political arena and has reached a broadly accepted
compromise without the hostility of the debate in America.105 In
relationships of trust and cooperation—a good marriage, for instance—people rarely press their legal rights and Athe assertion
of rights is usually a sign of breakdown in a relationship.@106
Critics of the obsession with rights advocate greater attention
to duties.107 To the biblical question AAm I my brother=s

of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1597–1600 (2000).
100. See Jennifer Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Foreign Direct Investment and the
Business Environment in Developing Countries: The Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties, *2 (Jan. 3, 2005), at http://www.law.nyu.edu/weilerj/spring05/globalization/RoseAckermanFDI_BITs.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
101. FUKUYAMA, supra note 4, at 315. “[T]he cumulative and unintended effect [of forbidding discrimination by private organizations] was for the state to become an enemy of
many communal institutions. Virtually all communities saw their authority weakened. . . .@ Id. Disgruntlement over America=s obsession with rights is also common on the
far left. “Rights are said to be alienating. They separate people from each other—’stay
away, I=ve got my rights’—rather than encouraging them to form close, respectful communities.” RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION
24 (2001).
102. See GLENDON, supra note 89, at 76–89, 171 (discussing lack of responsibility dialogue).
103. See id. at 64–66.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 65.
106. Id. at 175.
107. In America, unlike other liberal democracies, Arights have an absolute character
that is not balanced or moderated by constitutional language outlining duties to the community or responsibilities to other people.@ FUKUYAMA, supra note 4, at 315.
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keeper?,@108 more and more Americans reply ACertainly not.@
Modern liberal polities, in order to live up to their own professed
ideals, require not only a citizenry that is prepared to accept some
responsibility for the less fortunate, but citizens who are willing, so
far as is possible, to take responsibility for themselves and their dependents. Conservatives tend to lament deficiencies in the latter
area; progressives, in the former. But neither finds in American public discourse a ready vocabulary to express these important (and inseparable) concerns.109

III. RACE IN AMERICA TODAY
A. Distrust and Despair
Forty years ago most Americans were optimistic about race relations. World War II era court decisions and state and federal
statutes forbade most state-sponsored and much private discrimination. Racial hostility appeared to be crumbling. It seemed
that racial inequality could be quickly narrowed and soon eliminated.110
There has been progress. Polls document changing attitudes
about race.111 African-Americans now hold positions that many
blacks and whites thought whites would never have allowed.
Blacks have made economic progress both absolutely and relative
to whites.112 Unfortunately, progress has been small and slow.
108. Genesis 4:9.
109. GLENDON, supra note 89, at 105.
110. AIn the heyday of the civil rights movement . . . those who fought for racial equality were optimists, and that optimism seemed vindicated by events.@ BEYOND THE COLOR
LINE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND ETHNICITY IN AMERICA 2 (Abigail Thernstrom &
Stephan Thernstrom eds., 2002) [hereinafter BEYOND THE COLOR LINE].
111. In a 1995 poll, only thirty percent of blacks agreed that “the problems that most
blacks face are caused primarily by whites,” and only twenty-five percent of blacks believed that “the most important step in improving race relations involved ‘white Americans doing more to recognize and reduce racism by whites against blacks.”‘ Everett C.
Ladd, What Americans Think About Race and Ethnicity, in BEYOND THE COLOR LINE, supra note 110, at 53, 56.
112. In a 1985 poll, sixty-six percent of blacks surveyed felt that as a group they were
Amaking progress@ in America, although sixty-one percent of blacks in leadership positions
said the group was Agoing backwards.@ Martin Kilson, Problems in Black Politics: Some
Progress, Many Difficulties, DISSENT, Fall 1989, at 526, 527. See generally STEPHAN &
ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICAN IN BLACK AND WHITE: ONE NATION, INDIVISIBLE (1997);
Finis Welch, Half Full or Half Empty? The Changing Economic Status of African Americans, 1967-1996, in BEYOND THE COLOR LINE, supra note 110, at 181 (discussing how the
status of African Americans has changed over the past thirty years in regards to the labor
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Even in the prosperous 1990s, while the economic status of blacks
rose, the gap with whites barely narrowed.113 In some ways conditions have worsened. Unemployment and illegitimacy rates, once
approximately equal by race, are now much higher for blacks.114 A
large number of blacks now seem to comprise an underclass, unconnected to mainstream American society in school, work or
residence.115
Views diverge about what went wrong. Some consider the second-class status of blacks immutable. Derrick Bell wrote,
Those who urge emigration would not be guilty of exaggeration were
they to argue as follows:
Black people will never gain full equality in this country. Even our
most successful efforts will produce no more than temporary “peaks of
progress.” Given this unassailable truth, blacks need to acknowledge
the permanence of their subordinate status.116

In this view, whites get both material and psychic benefits from
repressing blacks.117
If the permanence thesis is correct, it is worse than useless to
seek racial progress. Many social problems can be ameliorated; it
would be foolish or callous to waste resources on immutable ills.
It would also be pointless for blacks (especially the young) to pursue education, hard work and other middle class values that
market). In some categories blacks now earn more than whites with equal credentials. See
Abigail Thernstrom, The Racial Gap in Academic Achievement, in BEYOND THE COLOR
LINE, supra note 110, at 259, 261–62.
113. See Roger O. Crockett & Peter Coy, Progress Without Parity, BUS. WK., July 14,
2003, at 100.
114. See SANDRA LUCKETT CLARK & MAI WEISMANTLE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
EMPLOYMENT STATUS: 2002, CENSUS 2000 BRIEF 5 (Aug. 2003) (showing 3.0% unemployment rate for whites and 6.9% for blacks).
115. See id.
116. DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 62 (3d ed. 1992).
117. See DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF
RACISM 7–8 (1992) (discussing racial consciousness of whites); DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 101, at 7 (stating that “racism advances the interests of both white elites (materially) and working-class people (psychically)”); ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK
AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 60 (1992) (stating that “no white American,
inclding those who insist that opportunites exist for persons of every race, would change
places even with the most successful black American”). Such views are not uncommon.
APessimism is strikingly pervasive in civil rights circles today.@ BEYOND THE COLOR LINE,
supra note 110, at 2. This was not always the case. See supra note 110 and accompanying
text. Some whites do derive psychic satisfaction and material advantage from the inferior
status of blacks. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 3, at 1764 (stating that Arace-based
employment decisions will not necessarily be motivated by racial animus but by an employer=s interest in realizing the efficiency gains of homogeneity@).
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bring success for other Americans. Indeed, if this path is blocked
by racism, it may make sense to adopt an oppositional culture
that flouts (white) middle class values, seeks solace in substance
abuse, and strikes back with crime.118 If the permanence thesis is
wrong, it is also counterproductive. APoorly conceived allegations
of racial misconduct . . . spread harmful confusion.@119 They may
dissuade people from undertaking beneficial action.
Some who do not necessarily embrace the permanence thesis
still reject a liberal approach to race problems because they consider it rests on a A[m]istaken belief that sweeping social reform
can be accomplished through speech and incremental victories
within the system.@120 In this view, A>[e]verything must change at
once,= otherwise the system merely swallows up the small improvement one has made, and everything remains the same.@121 It
is hard to imagine, though, how everything in our society could
change at once, so this position also seems to lead despair.
B. Reasons for Hope
Most Americans, black and white, reject the permanence thesis. Since race is so sensitive an issue, helpful objectivity can be
gained by comparing other protracted group conflicts. For centuries France and Germany fought wars that cost millions of
lives.122 This hostility seemed permanent, but within a few years
after World War II the two were military allies and partners in
an economic union that brought unprecedented prosperity to
both.123 This development is not unique or even unusual. As one
more example, Protestants and Catholics slaughtered each other
for centuries.124 Today, few even know what these wars were
about.
Group hostility ends when each side realizes that it loses from

118. See infra notes 157–62 and accompanying text (discussing the Aoppositional culture@).
119. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 8 (1997).
120. DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 101, at 146 (calling this belief the Aempathic
fallacy@).
121. Id. at 57.
122. See John Norton Moore, Beyond the Democratic Peace: Solving the War Puzzle, 44
VA. J. INT’L L. 341, 428 (2004).
123. See, e.g., Frans B.M. de Waal, Evolutionary Ethics, Aggression, and Violence: Lessons from Primate Research, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 18, 20 (2004).
124. See Daniel Philpott, Religious Freedom and the Undoing of the Westphalian State,
25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 981, 981 (2004).
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conflict and can gain from cooperation.125 That realization, however, comes less from changing individual minds than from
changes of generations; a generation committed to endless combat
dies off and is succeeded by a generation that sees the futility of
strife and the promise of collaboration. This evolution often takes
longer than a single generation and how long it takes depends
largely on the wisdom of the leaders of each group.
Progress is slow because people do not naturally see the benefits of cooperation; it is an acquired taste. An old joke tells of a
genie who promises to grant a Russian peasant his greatest wish.
The peasant does not hesitate; he knows just what he wants—the
death of his neighbor=s cow. Much of the world still thinks like
that, which is why so many group conflicts persist. Conciliation is
also blocked by the machinations of those who profit from continued conflict. In Europe=s religious wars, for example, many ecclesiastics and soldiers on both sides gained position, power, and
prestige from the strife.126
Martin Luther King, Jr. understood the importance of cooperation.127 Most white Americans now realize that discrimination
against blacks is not only harmful to them, and unjust, but also
damages whites. Whites in the old Confederacy were not the richest white Americans, but the poorest.128 Since the end of segregation, the condition of Southern whites compared to other white
Americans has not deteriorated but improved. Skilled, productive, and prosperous blacks who are integrated into the American
economy and society compete with whites for desirable jobs, but
they are a much greater asset to the nation than they are as a
downtrodden minority.

125. See infra text accompanying note 284.
126. 1 Leonardo Bruni, Introduction to HISTORY OF THE FLORENTINE PEOPLE x (James
Hankins ed., Harvard Univ. Press 2001).
127. He said: AWe must all learn to live together as brothers or we will all perish together as fools. We are tied together in the single garment of destiny, caught in an enescapable network of mutuality.@ Martin Luther King, Jr., Remaining Awake Through a
Great Revolution, Sermon at the National Cathedral (Mar. 31, 1968) in A KNOCK AT
MIDNIGHT: INSPIRATION FROM THE GREAT SERMONS OF REVEREND MARTIN LUTHER KING,
JR. (Clayborne Carson & Peter Holloran eds., 1998). Derrick Bell agrees that whites will
allow black progress when there is a convergence of the interests of both, but he mistakenly believes that such occasions are rare. See Derrick A. Bell Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980); Derrick A.
Bell, Jr., California=s Proposition 209: A Temporary Diversion on the Road to Racial Disaster, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1447, 1452 (1997).
128. See Staige Blackford, One Man’s South, 44 Emory L.J. 847, 848–49 (1995) (discussing inferior conditions of southern states as compared to their northern neighbors in
the nineteenth century).
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Blacks can gain even more than whites from cooperation.
White Americans alone are numerous and wealthy enough to
comprise a market large enough to be efficient. Further, many
white-owned American firms operate in global markets, which increases opportunities for profitable exchange. The AfricanAmerican market by itself is too small to be efficient in most industries and is not well integrated into global markets.129
Although African Americans have made economic progress in
recent decades, that progress may not accelerate, and may even
slow further, unless race relations improve. The ethnic profile of
America is changing; Hispanics now outnumber blacks as America=s largest minority.130 Perhaps blacks can increase their economic and political power by coalescing with other, growing minority groups. The interests of minority groups, however, are not
all the same. For instance, racial preferences for blacks in university admissions harms Asian Americans.131 Further, where the
situations of various minorities are similar, they may compete for
benefits rather than cooperate.132 Because of competition from
immigrant workers, for example, blacks have fled regions of high
immigration.133 The growing number and variety of ethnic minori-

129. See generally e. christi cunningham, Identity Markets, 45 HOW. L.J. 491 (describing “identity markets” based on race and the detrimental effects on black workers and the
perception of black workers).
130. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Hispanic Population Reaches All-Time High
of 38.8 Million, New Census Bureau Estimates Show (June 18, 2003), available at
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/hispanic_origin_population
/001130.html. (last visited _____.); see also Haya El Nasser, 39 Million Make Hispanics
Largest U.S. Minority Group, USA TODAY, June 19, 2003, at A1.
131. See Linda Chavez, Promoting Racial Harmony, in THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
DEBATE 314, 320 (George E. Curry ed., 1996) (citing a University of California report stating “Asian-American admissions would increase by 15 to 25% if the university based its
decisions on academics and socioeconomic status but not race.”); Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 68 (2002) (AIncreasingly,
affirmative action in effect punishes the stunning academic and economic achievements of
many Asians by excluding them, like whites, from eligibility for preferences.@).
132. See NICOLAS C. VACA, THE PRESUMED ALLIANCE: THE UNSPOKEN CONFLICT
BETWEEN LATINOS AND BLACKS AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR AMERICA 11–12 (2004); MARK R.
WARREN, DRY BONES RATTLING: COMMUNITY BUILDING TO REVITALIZE AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 27 (2001) (documenting frequent political competition between blacks and
other minority groups).
133. See Steven A. Holmes, Immigration Fueling Cities= Strong Growth, Data Show,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1998, at A10 (noting Adebate over whether increased competition for
jobs in areas where immigrants have clustered is pushing out people who are already living there, or whether those who depart would have left anyway, lured by better economic
prospects elsewhere@); Kenneth B. Noble, Blacks Say Life in Los Angeles Is Losing Allure,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1995, at A1 (reporting emigration of blacks from Los Angeles to
neighboring counties and out of state and movement of Hispanics into formerly black
neighborhoods). Many employers prefer immigrant workers to African-Americans. AEm-
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ties in America may dilute the empathy of whites for African
Americans.
Current demographic trends reinforce a national ideological
shift toward social libertarianism and economic conservatism. Although racial preferences in hiring and admissions for blacks and
some other minorities are common, antipoverty programs are out
of fashion in both political parties. Thus it was a Democratic
president, Bill Clinton, who declared an end to Awelfare as we
know it.@134 While social welfare spending has increased for programs like drug benefits for the elderly that benefit the broad
middle class;135 they do not particularly aid blacks, especially poor
blacks.136 To the extent that whites acknowledge any debt to
blacks, they are likely to feel that this debt is being discharged by
racial preferences in employment and school admissions and minority set-asides for government contracts. These programs, too,
confer little benefit on the poor.
In sum, the neglect of race relations is not benign for blacks.
Progress toward racial equality will require special efforts entailing increased trust and cooperation between the races.
C. Sources of Mistrust
There is ample reason for racial mistrust in America. People
naturally fear those who differ from themselves,137 so some racial
mistrust is probably instinctive. More important are the “history
effects”138 of slavery, Jim Crow segregation, discrimination and
charges of innate racial inferiority. Whites who have not contributed to this history are hurt if they are personally mistrusted;
they feel this mistrust is irrational. To make sense of the world,
however, all people use heuristic devices to place things in categories.139 In other words, all people employ stereotypes. In cases

ployers perceive a stronger work ethic among immigrants of all racial groups, and a
greater willingness to accept and retain low-wage jobs.@ Harry J. Holzer & Paul Offner,
The Puzzle of Black Male Unemployment, 154 PUB. INT. 74, 76 (2004).
134. Jason DeParle, The Clinton Welfare Bill: A Long, Stormy Journey, N.Y. TIMES,
July 15, 1994, at A1.
135. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
136. See, e.g., Robert Conot, Saul Alinsky Lives: Populist Groups Go Back to Basics, Revive Poverty War, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1989, at 3.
137. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
138. See Gautschi, supra note 41, at 132–33 (theorizing that ‘history effects’ impact
people’s choices about the future).
139. See DIANE ACKERMAN, AN ALCHEMY OF MIND: THE MARVEL AND MYSTERY OF THE
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of group hostility, people distrust all members of the opposing
group.
In part this is rational, even necessary. Even if one realizes
that most members of the other group are not dangerous, some of
the others are dangerous and one cannot tell which those are. The
costs of an injury (whether physical, financial, or emotional) from
mistaken trust usually exceeds the benefits of mistaken mistrust.
Most people are risk averse, so mistrust of all members of the
other group is often an individually rational choice. People who
distrust another often construe ambiguous behavior to confirm
the distrust. An innocent glance may be construed as a hostile
glare or a lascivious leer. If a white waitress is rude to all customers, a white customer will probably conclude that the waitress
is rude to everyone. A black customer, though, may assume that
the waitress is rude only to African Americans.
Stereotypes distort reasoning even if (perhaps especially if)
they are unconscious.140 Stereotypes Aundermine an observing
agent=s ability to see . . . [the stigmatized] as a person possessing
a common humanity with the observer—as >someone not unlike
the rest of us. . . .’”141 Negative stereotypes create “stereotype
threat,” that is, fear and self-doubt that cause victims to perform
less well than they otherwise would when subject to scrutiny.142
False stereotypes can be corrected. Familiarity with members of
another group generally reduces negative attitudes about the
group.143 For both blacks and whites, the more acquaintances
they have among the other race, the more likely they are to have
positive attitudes about that race.144 Unfortunately, racial integration is uncommon in America today; perhaps even less common now than a few decades ago. Racial separation was initially
imposed by whites and to some extent still is, but is now often

BRAIN 54–59 (2004) (describing how the human brain, in order to make sense of the world,
seeks patterns).
140. AAttitudes about stereotypic characteristics of groups of people can influence the
way we behave, without our having any awareness of this influence, or even of the attitudes themselves.@ Janice Nadler, Northwestern University School of Law, Flouting the
Law: Does Perceived Injustice Provoke General Non-Compliance? 24 (2002) at
http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=353745 (last visited ______).
141. GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 67 (2002).
142. See generally id. at 17–54 (detailing how stereotypes affect the holder as well as
the object).
143. See C. DANIEL BATSON, THE ALTRUISM QUESTION: TOWARD A SOCIALPSYCHOLOGICAL ANSWER 218–19 (1991). Of course, those who begin with more positive
attitudes about the other race are likely to develop more acquaintances among its members, so causation runs both ways.
144. See id.
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chosen by blacks.
Racial separation is a cause as well as an effect of racial strife.
Same-group identity encourages people to cooperate; differentgroup identity impairs cooperation.145 AMulticulturalism,@ which
is so fashionable now, especially in academia, often has the latter
effect. Multiculturalism holds that people (at least non-whites)
derive meaning and values from their cultural identity group—
typically an ethnic or religious group.146 This causes social “fragmentation”147 and “denial of the idea of a common culture and a
single society.”148 Arthur Schlesinger wrote: “[w]atching ethnic
conflict tear one nation after another apart, one cannot look with
complacency at proposals to divide the United States into distinct
and immutable ethnic and racial communities, each taught to
cherish its own apartness from the rest.”149
Expressions of despair like Professor Bell’s become selffulfilling prophecies.150 One who despairs does not bother to strive
for racial progress. Statements that racism is immutable also undermine trust. If whites profit from racial discrimination, blacks
properly suspect that expressions of racial goodwill by whites are
tricks to divert black resistance or, at best, naive self-delusion.151

145. See Sally, supra note 21, at 68, 78.
146. For example, one major academic organization urged Athe study of one=s own particular inherited and constructed traditions [and] identity communities.@ Ass’n of American Coll. and Univ., THE DRAMA OF DIVERSITY AND DEMOCRACY: HIGHER EDUCATION AND
AMERICAN COMMITMENTS; xx–xxii (1995); see also Ramin Afshar-Mohajer & Evelyn Sung,
The Stigma of Inclusion: Racial Paternalism and Separatism in Higher Education, TEX.
EDUC. REV., Winter 2003–04, at http://www.educationreview.homestead.com/2003
stigma.html (last visited _____) (describing various college programs that encourage minority students to cultivate a separate ethnic identity). These programs not only divide
minorities from whites but also fracture minorities into smaller and smaller identity
groups.
147. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA: REFLECTIONS ON A
MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY 21 (rev. ed. 1998); see also SELIGMAN, supra note 31, at 155 (arguing that multiculturalism points to ”a reemergence of group identities” that are “contrary to those classic ideas of the individual that we associate with bourgeois political
forms and that were indeed essential to that mode of social organization”). AThe problem
with multiculturalism as it is practiced in the American educational system is that its underlying objective is not to understand but to validate the non-Western cultures of America=s various ethnic and racial minorities.” FUKUYAMA, supra note 4, at 320.
148. SCHLESINGER, supra note 147, at 141.
149. Id. at 22; see also FUKUYAMA, supra note 4, at 272 (stating that “ethnic diversity
can be a serious obstacle to the development of a common culture”).
150. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
151. Thus black parents teach their children “to be cynical, skeptical, and on guard toward White people and White-controlled institutions, including the public schools, as well
as toward Black authorities in the system whom they regard as White representatives.”
JOHN U. OGBU, BLACK AMERICAN STUDENTS IN AN AFFLUENT SUBURB: A STUDY OF
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Such attitudes persuade John McWhorter that “‘black America is
currently caught in certain ideological holding patterns’—chief
among them being the ideology of permanent victimhood—and
that these today are ‘much more serious barriers to black wellbeing than is white racism.’”152 Again: “Mistrust tends to feed on
itself.”153
Racial hostility affects behavior in other ways. Some black
youth who think that paths to success open to others are closed to
them take alternate routes (like crime) or abandon hope and seek
solace in drugs.154 Racial animus affects not only the choices people have (or think they have) but also the values they weigh in
making choices. Again, those who think society treats them fairly
tend to accept and follow society=s rules, even when they could
profit by breaking the rules; but those who feel abused often retaliate, even if they know retaliation will cost them.155
Victims of stereotypes often respond in ways that confirm the
stereotype, thereby creating a Afeedback loop.@156 Some blacks
have adopted an Aoppositional culture@ shaped by hostility to
white culture.157 Many black students claim doing well in school
is “acting white.”158 This attitude helps explain why blacks do

ACADEMIC DISENGAGEMENT 41 (2003). As a result, “students did not view their present
schooling as a preparation for their future . . . . Rarely did students make the connection
between their school career and what they wanted to be in adult life.” Id. at 167.
152. John H. McWhorter, Still Losing the Race?, COMMENTARY, Feb. 2004, at 37, 37.
153. See supra text accompanying note 43.
154. OGBU, supra note 151, at 159–60.
155. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
156. See LOURY, supra note 141, at 26–27, 105, 160; see also BAKARI KITWANA, THE HIP
HOP GENERATION: YOUNG BLACKS AND THE CRISIS IN AFRICAN AMERICAN CULTURE 137–40
(2002) (stating that the oppositional culture (including gangster rappers) glories in and
flaunts many black stereotypes).
157. For discussions of oppositional culture see FREDRICK C. HARRIS, SOMETHING
WITHIN: RELIGION IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLITICAL ACTIVISM 133–53 (1999); YANICK ST.
JEAN & JOE R. FEAGIN, DOUBLE BURDEN: BLACK WOMEN AND EVERYDAY RACISM 36–39
(1998).
158. See OGBU, supra note 151, at 85. Professor Ogbu reported that nearly half the
black high school students interviewed in an affluent suburb believed that Ahighly educated Blacks and successful Black professionals in White establishments and institutions
gave up or abandoned their culture and racial identity.@ Id. at 206–07. They believed A[i]t
was not cool to be work hard in school or be academically engaged.@ Id. at 213. This view is
not limited to conservatives. See THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 24, 45–46 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998) (stating that black students will perform better if their parents change the way they Adeal with their children@); Bob Herbert, Breaking
Away, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2003, at A23 (A[T]his perverse peer pressure to do less than
your best in scholarly and intellectual pursuits is holding back large numbers of black
Americans, especially black boys and men.@). Black students perform better in schools that
require parents to support academic effort. See BEYOND THE COLOR LINE, supra note 110,
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worse than whites even when socio-economic differences are factored out.159
Oppositional culture corrodes relations within the minority
group. Many blacks express admiration for black criminals as rebels against the white power structure.160 Most victims of black
criminals, however, are themselves black, despite denunciation
by black leaders of black-on-black crime.161 This crime also sours
whites’ attitudes toward blacks.162 The oppositional culture is
profitable for some.163
Resentment of another=s success is common to humans, especially when the other resembles ourselves. A poor black may more
easily accept the success of whites, which seems to confirm racial
injustice, than the success of fellow blacks, which shows that success for blacks is possible, so that those who fail should blame
themselves. Some black students who deprecate education pressure other blacks to do likewise, a phenomenon called the crabbucket syndrome.164 Ironically, this practice mimics the racial repression of the old South by punishing blacks who show any ambition or initiative. Some blacks also resent black entrepreneurs

at 270 (reporting the experience of KIPP Academy in New York City).
159. See OGBU, supra note 151, at 34–36.
160. See KENNEDY, supra note 119, at 26–27 (referring to the popularity of criminals in
black culture); Regina Austin, “The Black Community,” Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of
Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1776 (1992) (referring to Aa subtle admiration of
criminals@ among many blacks); Mark Naison, Outlaw Culture and Black Neighborhoods,
1 RECONSTRUCTION 128, 128–30 (1992) (explaining the “outlaw culture” that has developed amongt black youth).
161. See JEROME G. MILLER, SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 38 (1996); see also John J. DiIulio, Jr., The Question of Black
Crime, 117 PUB. INT. 3, 7 (1994); Adam Walinsky, The Crisis of Public Order, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, July 1995, at 39, 47.
162. See Christopher A. Bracey, Thinking Race, Making Nation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 911,
929 (2003) (reviewing GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY (2002))
(ANothing has proven more corrosive of modern American race relations than the perceived link between blackness and rampant criminality.@).
163. Today the protest identity is a career advantage for an entire generation of
black intellectuals, particularly academics who have been virtually forced to position themselves in the path of their university’s obsession with Adiversity.@
Inflation from the moral authority of protest, added to the racial-preference
policies in so many American institutions, provides an irresistible incentive for
black America=s best minds to continue defining themselves by protest.
Shelby Steele, The Age of White Guilt and the Disappearance of the Black Individual,
HARPER=S, Nov. 2002, at 33, 38. Black intellectuals who reject this identity risk the “fate of
invisibility.” Id.
164. See, e.g., Ron Suskind, Against All Odds: In Rough City Schools, Top Students
Struggle to Learn—and Escape, WALL ST. J., May 26, 1994, at A1 (describing instances of
the syndrome).
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and deny them patronage. This helps explain why black entrepreneurs are often less successful in their own neighborhoods
than immigrant competitors.165
Psychological damage to blacks helps to explain an apparent
paradox:
[W]hile whites complain that blacks are too race conscious, the African-American problem has been, in a way, that blacks have never
been race conscious enough to stick together in tightly knit economic
organizations. . . . [T]here are not the same traditions of trust and
solidarity linking black merchants with their customers as in America=s ethnic communities. Not only are blacks mistrusted by the surrounding white community, but . . . they mistrust one another.166

Again, altruism thrives when benefactors feel that beneficiaries
are like themselves and deserve help because they act responsibly.167 Separationism and the oppositional culture reduce the altruism of whites by making blacks more distant and different
from whites. Since altruism is contagious,168 declines in altruism
trigger a chain reaction. The downward spiral is fed by declarations like Professor Bell=s that racial progress is impossible because people are less altruistic if they think altruism can do no
good: “the greater the perceived benefit to others, the greater the
incidence of cooperation.”169
In the logic of the oppositional culture, victim status may become a goal itself. Many cultures glorify victims; the veneration of
martyrs in Christianity and Islam is one example.170 The multiculturalism now in fashion requires victim status, whether based
on race, gender, class, or sexual preference. Victim status seems
especially desirable when the alternative is mundane. Racial
equality for blacks means moving into middle class existence with
jobs like accounting, mowing the lawn, and paying the kids= dentistry bills. This type of lifestyle may seem unappealing, particu-

165. A[T]he lack of a black entrepreneurial class has for long been a staple of the sociological literature.@ FUKUYAMA, supra note 4, at 297; see also Ezra W. Zuckerman, On Networks and Markets by Rauch and Casella, eds., 41 J. ECON. LITERATURE 545, 556 (2003)
(referring to Athe well-known weakness of African American (retail) entrepreneurship
[that] may result in part from the absence of [ethnic] networks@).
166. FUKUYAMA, supra note 4, at 295–96.
167. See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
169. Stout, supra note 6, at 13.
170. Thus it is said that Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat Aprefer[ed] to play the victim
rather than the statesman.@ Thomas L. Friedman, Editorial, Arafat=s War, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 13, 2000, at A33.
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larly as contrasted with the heroic age of protest in the Civil
Rights movement.171 Thus, there is ambivalence about whether
equality is desirable.
There is also ambivalence about how to achieve equality. For a
disadvantaged group to commit to improve itself seems to concede
some fault for its problems. Even blacks who favor greater selfhelp hesitate to say so for fear of abetting Ablaming the victim.@172
The group may, therefore, insist that all concessions come from
the dominant group. This attitude seems to underlie demands of
some blacks for reparations.173 On the other hand, a Agift@ of
equality does not restore honor.174 To accept relief as charity belies the claim that one is a victim and entitled to relief. To demand relief as a right is coercive, however, and donors resist coercion. Thus, a dispute about whether to label relief as charity or
reparations can thwart agreement even if the parties can settle
on the amount of relief.
Heuristic biases further complicate race relations. People want
to be fair but tend to favor themselves in gauging what is fair.
Thus people give themselves too much credit when they succeed
and too little blame when they fail, and they underestimate the
obstacles to success that others face. This bias abets the belief of
many whites that many blacks do not deserve help. Blacks may
overstate the obstacles they face and underestimate their ability
to overcome obstacles.
D. The Difficulty of Dialogue
When trust is deep, people can discuss and usually resolve disputes. Mistrust feeds on itself, however, making it hard even to
discuss reconciliation. Because of the sad history of race relations
in America, discussions about race tend to be aggressive and acrimonious, and lawyers tend to be among the most rigid and
dogmatic participants. Professor Burlette Carter believes:

171. See KITWANA, supra note 156, at 153 (describing the effects of the Civil Rights
movement as “large and transformative”).
172. See generally Risa E. Kaufman, The Cultural Meaning of the “Welfare Queen”: Using State Constitutions to Challenge Child Exclusions Provisions, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 301, 310 (1997).
173. See KITWANA, supra note 156, at 25–26 (discussing some black Americans’ desires
for reparations are fueled by the lack of economic equality, even during a time of American
economic growth).
174. Bracey, supra note 162, at 934 (AAs both Tocqueville and Patterson observed, the
bestowal of freedom and civil rights do [sic] little to restore honor.@).
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[Whites] are often stunned by a guilt that they are not sure is their
own, but that they feel as deeply as if it were. And we [AfricanAmericans] are left angry—at ourselves for expecting mutual vulnerability—and at them for, once again, we believe, shifting the focus of our comments from our pain to their guilt. And so the next
time . . . we simply say nothing at all.175

Professor Carter also refers to Athe impasse that African
Americans know exists between them and whites in public conversation, an impasse indicative of a larger life separation.@176
Ironically, the wealth of opportunities for mutually beneficial
racial cooperation is a problem. When both sides realize that the
range between their reservation points (points beyond which an
agreement is not beneficial) is narrow, there is little to negotiate.
When the range is broad, though, each side may haggle endlessly
in pursuit of an agreement more favorable to itself and closer to
the other=s reservation point.177
IV. THE UNCERTAIN GOALS
Deep trust is needed only for collaboration to pursue complex
goals. If there is no shared goal—if, say, the goal is only to avoid
interracial conflict—deep trust is unnecessary. Discussions of
race in America often assume an agreed goal, such as equality.
The meaning of equality is notoriously elastic, however.178 As in
the famous case of the two ships called The Peerless,179 two people
may use the same word but mean very different things.
Acceptance of minorities by the majority in America is conditioned on assimilation.180 Assimilation entails acceptance of established standards of conduct—speech, dress, and manners—

175. W. Burlette Carter, What=s Love Got To Do with It? Race Relations and the Second
Great Commandment, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 133, 134 (Michael
W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001).
176. Id. at 135.
177. See RUSSELL B. KOROBKIN & JONATHAN ZASLOFF, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS
ANGELES SCHOOL OF LAW, LAW & ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER SERIES, ROAD BLOCKS TO
THE “ROAD MAP”: A NEGOTIATION THEORY PERSPECTIVE ON THE PAST FAILURE AND
FUTURE PROSPECTS OF “LAND FOR PEACE” 38 (2004), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=512064 (last visited ____).
178. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 547 (1982).
179. Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (1864).
180. See Reed Ueda, Immigration and Group Relations, in BEYOND THE COLOR LINE,
supra note 110, at 37, 37.
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and of certain values associated with Protestantism.181 Protestants formed “the mold within which American culture as such
was cast in the nineteenth century, and other religious groups
like Catholics and Jews who had no experience of voluntaristic religion in Europe gradually came to share similar qualities . . .
[t]hey assimilated the same value system.”182
Assimilation allows some cultural distinctiveness; Italian
Americans did not have to abandon opera in order to be accepted
in America. In practice, however, group identity declines and often virtually vanishes. For example, except for a few innocuous
cultural festivals, there is no identifiable Scottish American or
Dutch American community.183 Many consider assimilation benign, especially as compared to oppression of the minority. Many
African Americans, however, want to preserve their culture
rather than be engulfed by the white majority.184
For decades a primary goal of the Civil Rights movement was
racial integration. As de jure segregation ended, though, many
blacks shunned integration except in government and the workplace; they accepted or preferred separate residential and social
communities. No doubt, this attitude stemmed in part from the
persistent indifference or hostility of whites to integration. The
arrival of any substantial number of blacks in a neighborhood or
public school routinely precipitated “white flight.”185
Separation is now common not only in neighborhoods, schools,
and churches but even in universities. Many have dormitories
and academic and extracurricular programs dedicated primarily
to blacks.186 This separation finds theoretical justification in multiculturalism=s insistence on a strong group identity.187 Separation also appeals to some black politicians and academics (called
Arace men@188) whose positions depend on continuing racial ten181. See BELL, supra note 116, at 58–59.
182. FUKUYAMA, supra note 4, at 293.
183. See Reed Uedu, Immigration and Group Relations, in BEYOND THE COLOR LINE,
supra note 110, at 39.
184. See generally Philomena Essed & David Theo Goldberg, Cloning Cultures: The Social Injustices of Sameness, 25 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 1066, 1066 (2002) (“[C]onsider[ing]
the cultural considerations regarding the reproduction of sameness and the implications of
cloning for issues of social injustice.”).
185. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 515 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (accepting the term “white flight” to describe the migration of whites from mixed race areas
to the suburbs).
186. See Afshar-Mohajer & Sung, supra note 146, at 5–23 (documenting racial separation in campus programs and facilities).
187. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
188. See HAZEL V. CARBY, RACE MEN 4 (1998).
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sion.
Separation entrenches racial tension. As noted earlier, trust
and cooperation are easier between people who know each other
and consider themselves similar;189 racial separation makes trust
and cooperation harder. Separation does economic harm to minorities. Many black neighborhoods are distant from most jobs,
especially better paying jobs.190 High unemployment, broken
families, low commitment to education, and rampant drug abuse
and crime in these communities leave young people few good role
models. It is hard for them to learn the keys to economic success
since they have little contact with the business and professional
worlds and major non-profit organizations. Higher education
helps blacks who pursue it to overcome these obstacles, but the
racial separation common on American campuses now reduces
that benefit.
Most whites dislike separationism and favor assimilation for
blacks and other minorities, even though whites created segregation and still often reinforce it. Although African Americans have
a right to resist assimilation, American principles guarantee a
right to pursue happiness, not to economic equality.191 It is accepted that individual economic success is tied to adoption of
middle class norms.192 Economic success of a group also requires
that it follow these norms.193 Many whites will not be troubled by
economic inequality between the races if many blacks reject these
norms and embrace an ethic that hinders economic progress.
We do not need comprehensive agreement on cultural assimilation or on all other goals, however; indeed, it is common for parties who lack trust to begin with limited cooperation.194 Blacks
and whites can agree on many steps even if they disagree on others. Further, attitudes are not uniform among either blacks or
189. See supra notes 29–31, 45 and accompanying text.
190. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 42 (1987); see also Andrew Hacker, Saved?, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, Aug. 14, 2003, at 22, 24 (stating that there are Aseveral reasons@ for the racial gap
in academic performance but that Aat the center is the racial isolation@ of AfricanAmericans).
191. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
192. See Daniel Markovits, How Much Redistribution Should There Be?, 112 YALE L.J.
2291, 2295–97 (2003) (referring to consensus among philosophers that equality should correct for luck but not for morally responsible choices).
193. Multiculturalism, including black separatism, Arepresent[s] a mode of identity contrary to those classic ideas of the individual that we associate with bourgeois political
forms and that were indeed essential to that mode of social organization.@ SELIGMAN, supra note 31, at 155.
194. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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whites; opinions diverge widely in each group. Since it is reasonable for any group to resist the imposition of another culture, it
must be stressed that there is nothing inherently Awhite@ about
these values. Though once identified with Protestantism,195 they
were never embraced by all American Protestants, and Francis
Fukuyama says that they “later became deracinated from those
ethnoreligious roots and became a broadly accessible identity for
all America.”196
The only error in this statement is that, while these values did
abet the Arise of the United States as a dominant global economic
power,@197 they are not uniquely American. They are what Max
Weber called the Protestant Ethic, to which he credited the economic rise of northwestern Europe.198 However, this ethic is also
not inherently Protestant or European. The economic ascent of
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore is attributed to similar values, which are said to stem from the indigenous culture.199 These are simply values that promote success in a
capitalist democracy. Urging people to adopt these values does
not imply that they were previously doing anything wrong. For
individuals, groups, and entire nations, external conditions beyond their control often preclude prosperity. Only when these
conditions are removed do values determine economic success.200
V. BUILDING INTERRACIAL TRUST AND EMPATHY
Despite many difficulties, there are some sources of interracial
trust and empathy in America today, and the literature on trust
and altruism suggests techniques to build on them.
A. Existing Sources of Trust and Empathy
Race relations in America are not unrelievedly bleak. There

195. See supra text accompanying note 191.
196. FUKUYAMA, supra note 4, at 270.
197. Id.
198. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Talcott Parson trans. 1930).
199. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 4, at 182–83. Japanese Buddhism promoted an ethic
Acomparable to early Puritanism@ in the West. Furthermore, it is still Acritical to the success of Japanese export industries.” Id. AAll East Asian cultures share a similar work
ethic.” Id. at 343.
200. See infra notes 230 and accompanying text.
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has been progress, albeit slow and uneven.201 Many Americans
feel trust and empathy for and behave altruistically toward other
races in general or at least to personal acquaintances of a different race or to institutions that promote interracial empathy.
Trust can take root and grow when two sides share basic norms.
Despite the important differences already mentioned, Athere are
many more beliefs, dreams, and views that whites and nonwhites
of all colors share than those that divide them.@202 On many issues—such as school prayer, school vouchers, abortion, and concern about crime, violence and drugs—African Americans are
more conservative than whites.203
Religion influences behavior as well as attitudes: AReligion, independent of social class, reduces deviance.@204 African Americans
have deep religious beliefs, primarily Christian.205 White Americans, too, are highly religious (at least compared to other Western
peoples), as are Hispanics, who are now America=s largest ethnic
minority.206 Judeo-Christian values are deeply ingrained in Western culture, especially in America.207 These values were openly
avowed by the Founders.208 The Declaration of Independence proclaims that all people Aare created equal@ and Aendowed by their
Creator with certain inalienable Rights,@ including ALife, Liberty
and the pursuit of Happiness.@209 Even Americans who reject Jewish and Christian religions accept these values. Thus, religion can
be a powerful adhesive.

201. See supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text.
202. ETZIONI, supra note 80, at 7.
203. Black Magic, ECONOMIST, July 15, 2000, at 29, 30; see also Ralph R. Reiland,
Crime and Race, 45 FREEMAN 516, 517 (1995) (stating that blacks are conservative on
crime issues); John M. McWhorter, Why Blacks Should Give Bush a Chance, CITY J.,
Spring 2001, at 28 (stating that blacks favor school Republican ideals); Juan Williams,
Bush Shouldn=t Write Off the Black Vote, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2004, at A21 (noting that
many blacks support school vouchers).
204. John J. DiIulio Jr., Supporting Black Churches, in BEYOND THE COLOR LINE, supra note 110, at 156. AAmong the most important [African American institutions] historically have been various black churches and religious groups, which have provided an important counterweight to the atomizing forces to which the community was subject.@
FUKUYAMA, supra note 4, at 303.
205. See, e.g., The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, Religion and Politics: Contention and Consensus, , at http://pewforum.org/publications/surveys/religion-politics.pdf (last
visited Feb. 26, 2005).
206. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
207. See, e.g., The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
208. Id.
209. Id.; see RICHARD VETTERLI & GARY BRYNER, IN SEARCH OF THE REPUBLIC: PUBLIC
VIRTUE AND THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 4, 47 (1987) (describing the Founders=
belief in religion as a source of public virtue).

DENT 394.DOC

134

2/27/2005 4:53 PM

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:000

The religious commitment shared by black and white Americans is the source of much of the good in our race relations. The
abolitionists appealed not to secular beliefs but to Christianity as
they persuaded western nations (including, eventually America)
that slavery, though common across the globe throughout history,
was immoral.210 Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Civil Rights
movement preached Judeo-Christian ideals to convince America
that Jim Crow segregation was a sin.211 These ideals also hold
that it is not enough to grant others legal freedom. God commands us to Agive to the poor.@212 Not surprisingly, then, religious
Americans are more inclined to undertake charitable activity.213
The duty of brotherhood extends beyond our relatives, tribes,
countrymen, or our ethnic or racial group. It is universal, embracing even members of rival tribes, like the injured Levite whom
the Good Samaritan rescued.214 As St. Paul said, in Christianity
A[t]here is neither Jew nor Greek,@ all mankind is one.215 We are
commanded to forgive, to A[l]ove your enemies, [and] do good to
them which hate you.@216 In racial conflict, where normal human
tendencies are to be aggressive, uncooperative, and stingy—
attitudes that breed fear and hostility—Judeo-Christian principles can promote trust and altruism. Not all nominal Jews or
Christians work to overcome racial injustice. Religious beliefs
vary, and although Judeo-Christian ideals spearheaded abolition
and the Civil Rights movement, their opponents also appealed to
religion and still do.217
The appeal to religion does not mean that atheists should be
excluded from racial dialogue or that religion should be established by government. Most non-religious Americans accept
norms like liberty and equality that stem from the Judeo-

210. See RODNEY STARK, FOR THE GLORY OF GOD: HOW MONOTHEISM LED TO
REFORMATIONS, SCIENCE, WITCH-HUNTS, AND THE END OF SLAVERY 338–59 (2003).
211. See David A.J. Richards, Ethical Religion and the Struggle for Human Rights: The
Case of Martin Luther King, Jr., 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2105, 2151 (2004) (stating that Dr.
King Adrew upon something that American whites and blacks deeply shared: constitutionalism and a religion that was broadly Judaeo-Christian.@).
212. Matthew 19:21.
213. See DiIulio, supra note 204, at 155.
214. Luke 10:30-37.
215. Galatians 3:28.
216. Luke 6:27.
217. See, e.g., Robert R. Merhige, Jr., The Promise of Equality: Reflections on the PostBrown Era in Virginia, 39 U. Rich. L. Rev. 11, 13 (2004) (quoting Gov. J. Lindsay Almond
of Virginia who responded to calls for integration of public schools by denouncing “those
who defend or close their eyes to the livid stench of sadism, sex, immorality, and juvenile
pregnancy infesting the mixed schools of the District of Columbia and elsewhere”).
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Christian tradition. Government grants to religiously-affiliated
institutions make sense when they are the best candidates to implement social programs, but this does not establish religion. Interracial dialogue need not even refer to religion; if trust is
strong, shared values become axiomatic. Judeo-Christian ideals
do not delineate a specific, comprehensive social program, so
theological allies can disagree on policies. Still, shared faith gives
black and white Americans both motive and means to cooperate.218
Differences of opinion between black and white Americans often stem more from disparities in socio-economic factors like income, education, and occupation than from race per se.219 Trust
can develop between subgroups,220 including members of different
races who are similar with respect to these social factors and,
therefore, likely to have similar values. There are two caveats,
however: first, there are areas of disagreement, including some of
the most sensitive issues in race relations;221 second, shared values are not the same thing as shared opinions.
[N]umerous surveys indicate that poor Americans on welfare have
similar attitudes toward work, thrift, and dependence that middleclass people do. But having the opinion that it is important to work
hard is different from having a work ethic, that is, being habituated
to getting up early in the morning to go to a dull or unpleasant job
and deferring consumption for the sake of long-term well-being.222

Thus, people who profess similar values may react differently to
initiatives and incentives.
On the other hand, people can agree on a policy even if they
disagree on the reasons for the policy. A[W]hile various groups in
a society may hold to different ultimate values, they may be able
to agree to support the same public policies, albeit on different
grounds.@223 Such agreement is common in pluralistic democra-

218. See WARREN, supra note 132, at 27 (describing success of local interracial coalitions despite significant sectarian theological differences).
219. See id. at 25–26.
220. See supra notes 28–35 and accompanying text.
221. See WARREN, supra note 132, at 15.
222. FUKUYAMA, supra note 4, at 38 (footnotes omitted); see also Lawrence W. Mead, A
Biblical Response to Poverty, in LIFTING UP THE POOR: A DIALOGUE ON RELIGION, POVERTY
& WELFARE REFORM 53, 66–67 (2003) (stating that the poor express the same attitudes
about work as the better-off, A[b]ut for obscure reasons, the poor often fail” to work to educate themselves and support their families@).
223. ETZIONI, supra note 80, at 245. In such cases, however, consensus is more fragile
than it is when both groups share the same values.
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cies.
B. Increasing Interracial Trust and Empathy
How can the techniques for building trust and empathy be used
to improve race relations in America? An initial step is to get the
two sides better acquainted in settings that highlight their mutual goodwill, common values, and interests, and discourage disputes. Cultural differences can be explored respectfully. Each side
must take care not to imply its own superiority or to deprecate
the other side. Multiculturalism and activities exhibiting cultural
diversity can serve these purposes and so combat the deprecation
of African and African American people and culture. Sometimes,
though, these efforts belabor supposed evils of Western civilization.224 This should be avoided.
A policy against disputes may itself spark disagreement. Aggrieved people want their grievances to be addressed. If, for instance, a marriage counselor advises a troubled couple not to discuss violence in their relationship because they disagree about it,
an abused spouse may justly feel that violence is the source of
their trouble and that the marriage cannot survive without discussing it. In race relations, a key issue is whether racial inequality stems from white racism or from insufficient effort by African
Americans. Although this is a fair question, the discussion often
collapses into a blame game of mutual recrimination that destroys trust and respect and blocks agreement or cooperation.225
No answer to this question can please everyone, but a partial
answer may satisfy many. Part of the problem is conflicting conceptions of Aracism.@ Most whites relate it to current conduct. Seeing how much racial discrimination and prejudice have declined,
they deny that racism is still common. Whites must acknowledge,
however, that the subordinate status of blacks stems not from
moral or intellectual inferiority, but from history. People of any
race who are denied education, skilled employment, and equal
protection of the law cannot thrive as do those who have enjoyed
these benefits.

224. See supra notes 145–49 and accompanying text.
225. Thus Julian Bond, then chairman of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, decried the “‘new racists,’ [who] see continuing black-white disparities
as
the
consequence
of
‘family
breakdown,’
a
‘lack of middle-class values,’ a paucity of ‘education and skills,’ and of the ‘absence of role
models.’” See BEYOND THE COLOR LINE, supra note 110, at 6. “‘[T]hese are symptoms. Racism is the cause; its elimination is the cure.’” Id.
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This is true not only for groups within a society, but of entire
nations. Current economic disparities among European countries
show the irrelevance of race in this regard. Nations recently freed
from Soviet enslavement lag far behind nations long free.226 Unfortunately, people freed from oppression are often slow to embrace the individual habits that bring success in a free society
and the political programs of liberal, capitalist democracy.227 A
good example is eastern Germany, which still lags behind the
west despite national reunification.228 Eastern Germans lack the
work ethic, initiative, thrift, and solicitude for clients and customers that western Germans have.229 This is not surprising.
These traits do not come naturally to humans; they must be
learned, and not primarily in formal schooling, but in the family
and community as one grows up.
The economic success of some Asian nations is also instructive.
These nations were once poor by American standards because of
conditions beyond their control. When conditions changed, they
achieved economic growth (despite a dearth of natural resources)
by promoting education, industry, enterprise, thrift, and cooperation.230
Once, it was not only pointless but dangerous for blacks to pursue education or display enterprise. In the old South, it is said,
“‘whites don=t care how close Negroes get, just as long as they
don=t get too big.’”231 Blacks who showed any ambition were
dressed down and humiliated and could be robbed, beaten, imprisoned, or slain.232 Some may consider these facts too well
known to merit repetition, but given the long history of racial
slander alleging the innate inferiority of blacks, it is important to
repeat this truth.
Even though current conditions stem from history, it does not

226.See generally Unicef Warns of Poverty-Struck Kids in East Europe and Ex-USSR,
ANSA MEDIA SERVICE, Oct. 21, 2004.
227.See Bertrand Benoit, The Border That Separated Two Countries Is Long Gone, But
Starkly Different Economic Performance and Political Affiliations Show the Divisions Persist, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2004, at 17.
228. Id.
229. See generally id.
230. See World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report tbl.1, at
http://www.weforum.org/pdf/GCR/Growth_competitiveness_Index_2003_comparisons (last
visited ____).
231. See Gregory D. Stanford, Hypersegregation Label Still Applies to Area Suburbs,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 19, 2003, at 4J. Comedian Dick Gregory also retorted, “in
the North, whites don=t care how big Negroes get, just as long as they don=t get too close.”
Id.
232. See id.
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mean we have no control over the future. We have free will and
can make progress individually, in groups, and as a nation. After
World War II, many countries made remarkable economic gains.
Also, Victorian England achieved striking social progress, largely
by private efforts.233 The Civil Rights movement succeeded in ending de jure segregation and outlawing racial discrimination by the
government and, in many areas, by private parties.234 It proved
the fatalists wrong: racial progress is possible in America.
Any reference by whites to values or behavior of African Americans provokes objections that this lets whites off the hook for the
race problem they created. Many African Americans also call for
better values and behavior.235 These advocates are not, as sometimes charged, just a few unrepresentative black conservatives.
Many are liberals who certainly do not let whites off the hook.236
To reduce racial hypersensitivity on this issue it should be
stressed that people of all colors often must work hard to overcome injuries (physical or otherwise) suffered through no fault of
their own.237 This is true of communities and nations devastated
by, perhaps, a hurricane or military invasion, as well as individuals. It should also be stressed that most disadvantaged Americans
are white238 and that they are exhorted to adopt the same attitudes and conduct that is urged on African Americans.
The other side of the blame game is the charge that all whites
are morally responsible and legally liable for the plight of blacks.
This charge underlies the reparations movement, which demands
that white Americans pay for the injuries to blacks.239 The legal

233. See generally GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, POVERTY AND COMPASSION: THE MORAL
IMAGINATION OF THE LATE VICTORIANS (1991).
234. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000).
235. Felicia R. Lee, Cosby Defends His Remarks About Poor Blacks’ Values, N.Y. TIMES,
May 22, 2004, at B7.
236. See, e.g., Bob Herbert, Editorial, Civil Rights, The Sequel, N.Y. TIMES, July 7,
2003, at A13 (AMy suggestion: Hammer home the need to stop the self-destruction that
continues to block the advancement of millions of black Americans.@).
237. “You can blame a person for knocking you down but you can=t blame that person if
you refuse to get back up . . . . However much slave history taught us about the injustice
and misery we as a people had suffered, it did not excuse us from assuming responsibility
for ourselves and each other by altering its course.”
Malcolm X _________
238. The average poverty rate from 2001 to 2003 was 10.2% for whites and 23.7% for
blacks. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2003, at 12 (2004), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p60-226.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2005). There were,
however, approximately twenty-three million poor whites and eight million poor blacks.
Id.
239.
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basis for the claim is flimsy. The closest precedent for reparations—the payments by Germany and a few German companies
to some victims of the Holocaust and their children—is far different from the claims of the reparations movement.240 In general,
the idea of racial guilt and group reparations are in bad odor; no
reparations have been paid by or even seriously demanded from
the aggressors of World War II or from Russia for the enslavement of eastern Europe after that war.
Although reparations are often posed as an alternative to calls
for self-help that let whites off the hook, many proposals for reparations blur this distinction. Liability to a class is usually discharged by payments to each of its members, but many calls for
reparations eschew this remedy in favor of funding better schools
for blacks.241 This is wise, but it points out the folly of using the
term Areparations.@ Calls for better schools acknowledge that the
problems of blacks stem, in part, from poor education. Education
requires not just good schools but effort by students and their
families. Providing better schools rather than cash, then, in effect
requires reciprocal effort. Demands for reparations are also coercive and thus reduce the altruism of donors.242 They are unwise
because the cooperation of whites is essential.
Demands for reparations are also morally flawed. Most whites
are not personally guilty of racial wrongs or even the descendants
of people guilty of such wrongs. They reasonably deny liability,
especially since victims of racial discrimination are either dead or
have legal recourse against actual wrongdoers. Reparations are
demanded for all African Americans, but some are recent immigrants; they and their ancestors suffered no discrimination in
America.
Finally, the detriments suffered by blacks because of race are
not the only injuries suffered by Americans. The most important
determinant of the economic success of Americans is the quality
of the parenting they receive.243 People are also influenced by the

240.
241. See Carlos Sadovi, Reparations for Descendants of Slaves: Do Companies Owe a
Debt?, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Jan. 11, 2004, at 1E (stating that plaintiffs in lawsuit seeking reparations want recovery to be used to fund social programs); Tara Young, Professor:
Slave Reparations Go Beyond Money; Movement Is About Recognition, He Says, TIMESPICAYUNE (New Orleans), Apr. 16, 2004, at Metro1 (quoting reparations movement leader
Charles Ogletree, Jr. as saying that reparations should be used to fund programs, not just
be given to people in cash).
242. See supra notes 71, 78, 94–95 and accompanying text.
243. Not only are children unable to choose their parents, but the parents also lack
complete control over the quality of parenting they give. Parents who are poor or disabled
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neighborhood in which they grow up and the schools to which
they are sent, matters over which they have no control. Although
on average blacks trail whites economically,244 many blacks have
achieved economic success, and most poor Americans are not
black.245 Disadvantaged whites may reasonably ask why they
should not only be denied benefits demanded for blacks who are
better off than themselves but should also be expected to pay part
of those benefits.
Similar objections apply to the programs of racial preferences
that are now widespread. These programs produce paltry benefits
for a handful of the least needy blacks.246 In college admissions
they affect only a few elite schools.247 Most beneficiaries are capable people who would have done quite well anyway; preferences
merely bump them up a notch or two.
Lowering standards for blacks may sap their will to do their
best.248 Black students admitted to schools for which they are not
academically qualified tend not to perform well.249 They suffer a

are less able to give their children good care. Susan E. Mayer & Leonard M. Lopoo, Has
the Intergenerational Transmission of Economic Status Changed?, Joint Center for Poverty Research, Working Paper No. 227, available at http://www.jcpr.org/wpfiles/
mayer_lopoo.PDF?CFID=4460116&CFTOKEN=65444000 (last visited Feb. 26, 2005).
244. Moreover, “[i]n 1995, the median income for black families was $25,970, while the
figure for whites was $42,646.” JOHN H. MCWHORTER, LOSING THE RACE: SELF SABOTAGE
IN BLACK AMERICA 9 (2000).
245. See supra note 238.
246. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 354 n.3 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(A[T]he Law School=s racial discrimination does nothing for those too poor or uneducated to
participate in elite higher education and therefore presents only an illusory solution to the
challenges facing our Nation.@); Martin Trow, Preferential Admissions in Higher Education, in BEYOND THE COLOR LINE, supra note 110, at 295 (noting that “in 1995, 30 percent
of black undergraduates [at University of California at Berkeley] came from families earning over $70,000”).
247. See Trow, supra note 246, at 294 (stating that Ano more than a hundred or so out
of the 3,700 colleges and universities in the United States” “have more applicants than
they can admit”).
248. “Out of deference, elite universities have offered the license not to compete to the
most privileged segment of black youth, precisely the segment that has no excuse for not
competing. . . . [W]hites and especially Asians have had to compete all the harder for their
spots. So we end up with the effect we always get with deferential reforms: an incentive to
black weakness relative to others.”
SHELBY STEELE, A DREAM DEFERRED: THE SECOND BETRAYAL OF BLACK FREEDOM IN
AMERICA 127 (1998). see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 377 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating
that the racial preferences system reduces incentive for black applicants to improve their
LSAT scores); PAUL A. ZOCH, DOOMED TO FAIL: THE BUILT-IN DEFECTS OF AMERICAN
EDUCATION 198 (2004) (arguing that American schools need to demand more of students of
all colors).
249. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 372 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“These overmatched students take the bait, only to find that they cannot succeed in the cauldron of competition.”);
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stigma because everyone knows just by looking at them that they
are less qualified than their classmates. Simultaneously, the belief that any shortcoming of blacks stems from white racism gives
black students an easy alibi for poor performance.250 When they
take the next step (say as graduates seeking jobs), they suffer because others (like prospective employers) know that they were
admitted with lesser credentials. Further, racial preferences do
nothing for the vast majority of blacks who are not candidates for
the few positions allotted by racial preferences. Not surprisingly,
many blacks oppose preferences.251
Although the benefits of racial preferences are minuscule and
ill-targeted, they provoke terrible resentment among whites. This
resentment may be unwarranted, but it is not surprising. If a
prestigious school gives fifty seats to minorities through race preferences, fifty other applicants who would otherwise have been
admitted are rejected, but these fifty are not identified. Hundreds
of applicants may believe they were rejected because of race preferences. Hundreds more suspect they would not have been admitted even without racial preferences, but still resent the admission
of minorities with weaker academic credentials than their own.252
Further stoking resentment is the realization that many beneficiaries of racial preferences are wealthier than applicants who were
rejected.253 Some whites also object that, if a debt is owed to African Americans, it should not be foisted arbitrarily on a few random individuals by discriminating against them in employment
or school admissions; rather the burden should be borne by all
whites, preferably in proportion to their ability to pay.254
Whatever the moral merits of racial preferences, resentment is
a political problem for blacks. Because of both their own votes
and the desire of many whites for greater racial equality, blacks
have substantial political clout—substantial, but not limitless.

Stephan Thernstrom & Abigail Thernstrom, Reflections on The Shape of the River, 46
UCLA L. REV. 1583, 1605-08 (1999).
250. See STEELE, supra note 248, at 125 (stating that this attitude Anever requires that
[African Americans] actually develop as Americans, and absolutely never blames blacks
when they don=t develop”).
251. See PAUL M. SNIDERMAN & THOMAS PIAZZA, BLACK PRIDE AND BLACK PREJUDICE
149–50 (2002) (reporting that eighty percent of blacks oppose admitting less qualified
black students over more qualified white students even if the disparity is slight); see also
McWhorter, supra note 152, at 41 (citing a poll showing that eighty-six percent of black
voters opposed racial preferences).
252. See Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of Selective Admissions, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1046–48 (2002).
253. See supra note 248.
254.
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Resources squandered on racial preferences cannot be devoted to
other goals. Many whites believe that the current racial preferences exhaust the political capital of blacks. Thus, the opportunity costs of racial preferences are high.
Racial preferences are touted—and were upheld by the Supreme Court—as a means of achieving vital diversity.255 This
claim is widely considered weak or a mere subterfuge.256 Efforts
to document the educational benefits of racial diversity have been
embarrassing failures.257 This is not surprising; ethnic homogeneity (in colleges and elsewhere) does not prevent nations like Japan and the Scandinavian countries from competing successfully
in the global economy.258 The diversity rationale also treats preferences for blacks as a benefit primarily to whites even though
they are promoted largely by blacks.
Whites are unlikely to warm to race preferences. Many feel
that the racial discrimination cited to justify preferences has al-

255. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (holding that a public law school Ahas a compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body@).
256. See id. at 383 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (calling the university=s claim to be
seeking a critical mass of minorities for purposes of educational diversity Asimply a
sham@); Alan M. Dershowitz & Laura Hanft, Affirmative Action and the Harvard College
Diversity-Discretion Model: Paradigm or Pretext?, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 379, 407 (1979)
(A[T]he checkered history of >diversity= demonstrates that it was designed largely as a cover
to achieve other legally, morally, and politically controversial goals.@); R. Kent Greenawalt,
The Unresolved Problems of Reverse Discrimination, 67 CAL. L. REV. 87, 122 (1979) (AI
have yet to find a professional academic who believes the primary motivation for preferential admissions has been to promote diversity in the student body for the better education
of all the students.@); Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 471 (1997)
(AEveryone knows that in most cases a true diversity of perspectives and backgrounds is
not really being pursued.@); Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future,
20 YALE L. & POL=Y REV. 1, 34 (2002) (A[M]any of affirmative action=s more forthright defenders readily concede that diversity is merely the current rationale of convenience for a
policy that they prefer to justify on other grounds.@); Randall Kennedy, Affirmative Reaction: The Courts, the Right and the Race Question, AMERICAN PROSPECT ONLINE, Mar. 1,
2003 (stating that “[m]any who defend affirmative action for the sake of ‘diversity’ are actually motivated by a concern that is considerably more compelling . . . a commitment to
social justice.”); Orlando Patterson, Affirmative Action: The Sequel, N.Y. TIMES, June 22,
2003, at 11 (stating that no one really believes the diversity rationale for racial preferences). The ruse is further indicated by the fact that supposed advocates of diversity show
no interest in intellectual diversity. ASelective schools . . . have done little to attract students who are politically conservative or devoutly religious. . . . How many have enough
undergraduates to form a >right to life= chapter, for example?@ Hacker, supra note 190, at
22.
257. Both the methodology and the conclusions of these studies, however, have been
refuted. See, e.g., Stanley Rothman et al., Racial Diversity Reconsidered, 151 PUB. INT. 25,
29–38 (2003) (discussing the empirical flaws of these studies and the results obtained with
improved methods).
258. See Global Competitiveness Report, supra note 230, tbl.1.
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ready dwindled so that preferences should now end. Some states
now outlaw preferences in school admissions;259 others may follow
suit.260 Although the Supreme Court upheld race preferences,261
its demand that applicants be weighed individually and that race
not be a dominant factor in admissions will be hard for some
schools to meet.262 They can admit a Acritical mass@ of blacks (always five to ten percent of each class) only by using academic
standards so much lower as to flunk the requirement that race be
just one of many plus factors.263
Indeed, the Court upheld the law school=s racial preferences
only by accepting some factual claims derided as Asimply a sham@
by Chief Justice Rehnquist.264 Rejection of the college=s somewhat
different program led Justice Ginsburg to predict that schools
may Aresort to camouflage@ and Awinks, nods, and disguises.@265
Soon the Court will face new cases in which lower courts reject
such claims.266 Then the Court, hoist by its own petard, must

259. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31.
260. Karen W. Arenson, Ballot Measure Seen in Wake of Court Ruling, N.Y. TIMES,
July 10, 2003, at A17 (reporting that African American businessman Ward Connerly, who
led the successful effort to pass California=s Proposition 209, plans to put a similar measure before Michigan voters); Hacker, supra note 190, at 22 (stating that after decisions in
Gratz and Grutter Ait seems likely that at least a few other [states] will now be inclined to@
adopt laws forbidding racial preferences).
261. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
262. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 348–49 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (listing several possible issues for future litigation); Carl Cohen, Winks, Nods, Disguises—and Racial Preferences,
116 COMMENTARY 34, 37 (2003) (noting the sheer magnitude of the task of individualizing
admissions reviews at University of Michigan, which has 25,000 undergraduate applicants
annually); Mike France & William C. Symonds, Diversity Is About To Get More Elusive,
Not Less, BUS. WK., July 7, 2003, at 31 (stating that the Court’s ruling will force schools to
engage in a “laborious” analysis requiring employment of more admissions officers);
Hacker, supra note 190, at 22 (concluding that the University of Michigan Amay have a
hard time@ satisfying Grutter);
263. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 796–97 (6th Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting) (finding that the University of Michigan Law School gave Avery substantial additional
weight@ to minority applicants for admission), aff=d, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Trow, supra note
246, at 298–301 (describing the lengths to which the University of California at Berkeley’s
Law School, Boalt Hall, had to go to meet its goals for enrolling African-American students); Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical
Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admission
Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 14–18 (1997) (showing that most black law students would
not have been admitted if admissions were based solely on undergraduate grades and
LSAT scores); Lino A. Graglia, Winks, Nods—and Preferences, WALL ST. J., June 25, 2003,
at A12 (noting that almost no African Americans meet the median GPA and LSAT scores
of white students at the half-dozen top law schools).
264. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 383 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
265. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 304–05 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
266. See Cohen, supra note 262, at 38 (A[I]t will be very hard [for universities] to hide
the reality of their practices, and these will be subjected to continuing adverse scrutiny.@).

DENT 394.DOC

144

2/27/2005 4:53 PM

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:000

strike down most racial preferences or change its standard. The
Court also expressed doubt that preferences will for more than
twenty-five years.267 This declaration will fuel demands to begin
phasing out preferences, thereby lowering their benefits and raising their political cost to blacks.
Despite the gross flaws in racial preferences as a solution to
America=s racial problem, it is understandable that blacks cling to
them. A person may agree that her house or car is not ideal for
her needs, but she will not accept its simply being taken away
from her. The obvious solution is to trade in the unsuitable item
for one more appropriate. A trade-in makes sense for racial preferences. In economic terms, they are not Pareto Optimal.268 Although there will be no consensus on a substitute, both sides can
easily identify measures more beneficial to blacks and less objectionable to whites. Some of these are discussed below.269
How can a trade-in be negotiated? Racial preferences are
granted by many businesses, government agencies, schools, and
non-profit organizations.270 Negotiations with each would be impractical. Many of these institutions also lack resources that can
be substituted in exchange. Indeed, many institutions seem to
have adopted racial preferences out of a feeling that they should
do something about racial inequality and could not think of anything else to do. In other words, preferences are a gesture by
whites primarily to assuage their guilt.271 Accordingly, arranging
a trade-in will require national leadership that includes, but is
not limited to, the federal government.
One obstacle to a trade-in is that preferences have spawned an
industry employing many blacks.272 These programs need administrators. Also, since many blacks admitted or hired under prefer-

267. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
268. An economic situation is Pareto Optimal “when an individual cannot move into a
better position without putting someone else into a worse position.” DICTIONARY OF
FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 405 (John Downes & Jordan Elliot Goodman eds., 4th
ed. 1995).
269. See infra Part VI.
270. See PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE
DISTANCE 140–43 (2003).
271. See id. at 151 (“Affirmative action is often justified as a means of compensating
groups that have been victimized in the past by persecution and discrimination inflicted
by the dominant majority.”).
272. See OFFICE OF RESEARCH, INFORMATION AND PLANNING, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYMENT 2 (2003) (noting that blacks are the minority with the highest percentage of private sector employment).
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ences are less qualified than their white colleagues,273 they need
special assistance, like remedial courses and retention programs.
The desire of some blacks for separation from whites, intensified
by the stigma of preferences, leads to the creation of separate facilities, activities, and academic programs for blacks. All these
initiatives have to be staffed. Those employed in this industry
would be threatened by the end of preferences.274
Although the economics of a trade-in are easy, the politics are
hard. In a pluralist democracy, a small group that profits from a
program that disserves society as a whole often prevails if the
program=s costs to the majority are so diffused that few are motivated to oppose it. Accordingly, the terms of a trade-in should be
as explicit as possible so that its potential beneficiaries, especially
among blacks, will be motivated to support the trade-in.
C. Limiting the Group of Discussants and the Scope of Discussion
The current animosity in race relations makes it desirable to
limit the participants in racial dialogue. In group relations, levels
of trust typically vary among the members of each group and
from one locale to another.275 It makes sense for each side to
choose members with higher levels of trust to negotiate and execute joint projects.276 Since familiarity often breeds trust, cooperation may work best at the local level, where people know each
other better.277
An agent who impedes a mutually desirable bargain should be
fired.278 It is especially imperative to exclude obstructionists in
emotional areas like race relations. Since interracial cooperation
is needed, it is not enough for the two sides to bargain aggres-

273. See Thernstrom & Thernstrom, supra note 249, at 1610–11.
274. However, most of these people are skilled professionals who can find jobs elsewhere; indeed, some would certainly wind up producing something of use to society, which
they are not doing now.
275. See Michael W. Macy & John Skvoretz, The Evolution of Trust and Cooperation
Between Strangers: A Computational Model, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 638, 651 (1998).
276. See JOSEPH L. BADARACCO, JR., THE KNOWLEDGE LINK: HOW FIRMS COMPETE
THROUGH STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 141 (1991) (stating that a successful alliance needs
A>champions= . . . on both sides—that is, managers with appropriate skills who are personally committed to making the venture work@); LEWIS, supra note 11, at 29 (stating that
negotiating is so important that some firms “‘select people with less than perfect intellects
but with excellent interpersonal skills’”).
277. See WARREN, supra note 132, at 27 (describing success of many local interracial
coalitions); Macy & Skvoretz, supra note 275, at 653–58.
278. See KOROBKIN & ZASLOFF, supra note 177, at 33.
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sively; discussions should enhance trust so as to promote continuing cooperation. Discourtesy to the other side, displays of suspicion, and aggressive negotiating erode trust.279 Since some African-American leaders (at least in Congress) mistrust whites and
support policies offensive to whites,280 it would be wise to seek a
Acoalition of the willing.@ This already happens to some extent at
the local level,281 and opportunities for cooperation may be growing, since minority leaders are becoming more moderate.282 The
issues for discussion should also be restricted. Where trust is low,
parties should put aside grudges and seek common ground, Acontemplating visions about what the future could bring if only the
dispute that confronts them can be surmounted.@283 Cooperation
can expand as commitments are fulfilled and trust grows.284
Putting the two limitations together, some groups will be able
to reach agreement on certain issues, other groups on other issues. Of course, this already happens; various groups of black and
white Americans cooperate on issues on which they agree.285
These efforts need to be expanded. To some extent, this can be
done by private initiative, but the potential for private efforts
alone is limited. To maximize progress, government involvement
is needed.
D. Legal Liability vs. Moral Duty
Although the legal basis for reparations is weak, Judaism and
Christianity instruct those who are able to aid all who need
help.286 Arguing moral duty rather than legal liability has several
advantages apart from avoiding the jurisprudential flaws of the
latter. Psychologically, it is easier to accept a moral duty to help

279. See supra notes 38–50 and accompanying text.
280. See Tamar Jacoby, From Protest to Politics: Still an Issue for Black Leadership, in
BEYOND THE COLOR LINE, supra note 110, at 369, 371–73 (documenting a gap in attitudes
about race between black leaders and black public); see also supra note 112; infra text accompanying notes 333–34.
281. See Black Magic, ECONOMIST, July 15, 2000, at 29, 30 (reporting that some local
Republican officials have developed trust and cooperation with African-Americans).
282. See ETZIONI, supra note 80, at 30–32.
283. Howard Raiffa, Analytical Barriers, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 132,
140 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
284. See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
285. See WARREN, supra note 132, at 247 (noting the collaboration of black and white
Americans around a common policy agenda).
286. See Melanie D. Acevedo, Note, Client Choices, Community Values: Why FaithBased Legal Services Providers are Good for Poverty Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1491,
1523–24 (2002).
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the needy than to admit legal liability, which implies an admission of personal fault. Coercion provokes resistance,287 but voluntary donations make donors feel virtuous. It is also more appealing morally to aid the needy than it is to pay a legal debt to each
member of some group regardless of individual need.
The Civil Rights movement succeeded largely by squeezing the
conscience of whites.288 Most abolitionists were whites appealing
to the Christian beliefs of fellow whites.289 By contrast, the urban
riots of the late 1960s precipitated a conservative tide in politics
and accelerated white flight from cities.290 The push for racial
preferences and reparations have frittered away much political
capital while yielding little benefit.291 Stern reminders of JudeoChristian moral duties and the notion that whites themselves
would profit from the economic progress of African Americans,
coupled with offers of cooperation, can be effective, but militance
will fail.
Programs based on moral duty are also likely to be better for
the needy. Legal debts must be paid unconditionally, but charities can impose duties on recipients. These conditions can be buttressed by moral suasion as well as legal sanctions. Thus community leaders can exhort recipients of aid to keep their side of the
bargain; reparations carry no such moral duty. Further, performance standards can be imposed on aid programs. Effective programs can be given increased funding while failed programs can
be terminated. Reparations cannot be so treated.
Aid to the needy, both individuals and nations, is more effective
when performance standards are imposed on recipients and compliance is monitored. Even most liberals now admit that the rapid
expansion in the 1960s and 1970s of social welfare programs,
with few conditions on recipients, did not work well.292 Many be-

287. See supra notes 71, 78, 94–95 and accompanying text.
288. The exposure to the world of segregation and discrimination by the Civil Rights
movement also damaged the United States in the Cold War struggle with Communism.
Desire to end this negative publicity abetted the agreement of whites to end this mistreatment. Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the
Conservative “Backlash”, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1546–47 (2003).
289. See Stephen L. Carter, Reflections on the Separation of Church and State, 44 ARIZ.
L. REV. 293, 305 (2002).
290. See Feld, supra note 288, at 1546–47 (describing conservative impact of urban riots on criminal law policies); Clarence Page, What Brown Did Not Bring to Education,
CHI. TRIB., Mar. 17, 2004, at E29 (stating that urban riots helped cause white flight).
291. See supra notes 246, 255 and accompanying text.
292. See June E. O’Neill & M. Anne Hill, Gaining Ground? Measuring the Impact of
Welfare Reform on Welfaare and Work, Manhattan Institute Civic Report No. 17, at 2
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came dependent on welfare and lost the chance to climb the employment ladder and become good role models for their own children and their neighbors.293 In the 1990s, welfare restrictions and
renewed emphasis on work helped many make economic progress
while producing little of the indigence and other horrors that
some had predicted.294 This approach worked in part because recipients themselves approved it.295 The reforms of the 1990s were
far from perfect, though. Many who left welfare for work remain
in or near poverty.296 Americans should be much more generous to
these people. Demanding reciprocity and effective programs abets
generosity.297 Most Americans prefer assistance that requires reciprocal effort from recipients and helps them become independent.298
Government can learn from private charities that appeal to donors by publicizing their accomplishments. Governments can set
performance targets for their programs. Setting targets is particularly effective when the money goes to private organizations.
Government bureaucrats cannot be fired for failing to meet goals,
but grants to private groups can be ended. Organizations seeking
government money can be required to state their targets. To obtain grants, they have an incentive to set their goals high. To
keep the money flowing, they then have an incentive to meet
their own stated goals.
E. Racialized vs. Universal Programs
People tend to trust and cooperate with those they consider like

(July 2001).
293. See Margo D. Butts, Urban Welfare Reform: A Community-Based Perspective, 22
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 897, 898–99 (1995).
294. See Rebecca M. Blank & Robert F. Schoeni, Changes in the Distribution of Children=s
Family
Income
over
the
1990s
5,
(Jan.
2003),
available
at
http://www.personal.umich.edu/~bschoeni/blankschioeni%20pp.pdf (last visited ____;
O=Neill & Hill, supra note 292, at 4.
295. A[M]any welfare recipients themselves [said] that they needed the push of a work
requirement to overcome their own lack of initiative in finding jobs or training experiences
that later turned out to be valuable to them.@ Mary Jo Bane, A Catholic Policy Analyst
Looks at Poverty, in LIFTING UP THE POOR: A DIALOGUE ON RELIGION, POVERTY &
WELFARE REFORM (2003), at 12, 47; see also Mead, supra note 222, at 94 (AAll told, reciprocity emerges as clearly the best approach to aiding the poor through government . . . .@).
296. See Katherine Hunt Federle, Child Welfare and the Juvenile Court, 60 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1225, 1231–32 (1999).
297. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
298. See MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE
POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 58–59, 184–92 (1999).
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themselves and to distrust those they consider different.299 However, notions of who is like us and who is different often are not
deeply rooted but mutable and manipulable.300 The very act of
designating subgroups strengthens trust and cooperation within
each subgroup but weakens trust and cooperation between subgroups.301 Because of the complexity of and ambivalence about
race in America, the inclination of Americans to trust and cooperate with people of another color is highly unstable and subject to
outside influence.
To enhance trust and cooperation between blacks and whites,
we should stress our commonalities (like Judeo-Christian ethics)
and play down differences. Racial preferences and reparations divide us by race and thus erode trust and cooperation.302 Some local initiatives achieve cooperation by pursuing not Aaffirmative
action” but “affirmative opportunity.”303 Proposals that harp on
supposed behavioral shortcomings of poor blacks but not of poor
whites are also divisive. Although the poverty rate is higher
among blacks,304 there are more poor whites in America,305 so
blacks and whites can unite on an agenda to help the needy. The
poor of all races generally lack political clout; they need allies.
When people feel they need each other, they tend to eschew prejudice.306
The problems of the poor will not be cured by neglect (benign or
otherwise). Even in the prosperous 1990s, the income gap between blacks and whites barely shrank, and the gap between rich
and poor actually grew within each race.307 Social mobility also
declined. That is, not only did the amount of poverty persist, but
the poor were largely the same people and not a randomly rotating group of people either temporarily down on their luck, or

299. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text.
301. See Macy & Skvoretz, supra note 275, at 648 (noting that neighbors tend to both
trust and cooperate with each other, while they do not cooperate with strangers in one
part of the experiment).
302. See SCHUCK, supra note 270, at 165, 199 (stating that racial preferences are Asocially inflammatory@ and that race is Athe worst imaginable category around which to organize group competition and social relations more generally@); see also supra note 252 and
accompanying text (noting that racial preferences can cause white resentment toward minorities).
303. See WARREN, supra note 132, at 252; see also id. at 247–48 (describing work of Industrial Areas Foundation in many cities and other efforts in interracial cooperation).
304. See supra note 238.
305. See supra note 238.
306. See WARREN, supra note 132, at 27.
307. See ETZIONI, supra note 80, at 76–77, 148.
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young or newly arrived in America and destined to achieve prosperity quickly.308
Efforts (unlike racial preferences and reparations) not limited
to blacks may be derided as Acolor blind@ and inadequate. Justice
Harry Blackmun claimed: AIn order to get beyond racism, we
must first take account of race. There is no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently.@309 President Lyndon Johnson said: AYou do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him,
bring him up to the starting line of a race and then say, >you are
free to compete with all the others.=@310
However, many people are hobbled for many reasons, only
some of which relate to race. It is just to help all these people.
“We should help people who need help. There are, in fact, no races
that need help; only individuals, citizens.”311 President Johnson=s
metaphor has another implication: we can help those who have
been hobbled to join the race by giving them therapeutic counseling and equipment and economic support during therapy, but
they themselves must make a special effort for that therapy to
succeed. In a sense this is unjust because those who were not
hobbled need not exert that effort, but such injustice is unavoidable.
It is misleading to call measures color blind just because they
omit explicit racial criteria. Again, while most poor Americans are
not black, they are disproportionately black,312 so programs for
the poor disproportionately benefit blacks. For example, residents
of poor neighborhoods are often isolated from jobs.313 Efforts to
bring them to jobs and to bring jobs to them need not be racebased; since the problem is particularly acute for blacks, even
color-blind programs to mitigate the problem would benefit them
disproportionately. More generally, we can examine the racial effects of all public policies and prefer those that promote racial

308. See Gene Koretz, Land of Less Opportunity, BUS. WK., June 30, 2003, at 28.
309. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
310. Lyndon B. Johnson, To Fulfill These Rights, Address at Howard University (June
4, 1965), reprinted in THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND THE POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY 126
(Lee Rainwater & William L. Yancey eds., 1967).
311. Steele, supra note 163, at 42.
312. The American Marketplace, Most Poor Are White: Altough Blacks Are More
Likely to be Poor, Whites Account for the Majority of People Living in Poverty 161 (1999).
313. See Maurice E.R. Munroe, Unamerican Tail: Of Segregation and Multicultural
Education, 64 ALB. L. REV. 241, 247–49 (2000); Michael H. Schill, Deconstructing the Inner
City Poor, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 795, 802 n.36 (1991).
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equality and harmony.
Justice Blackmun was wrong that “[t]here is no other way.”314
Millions of blacks, like other Americans beset by problems they
did not make, have achieved economic success without racial
preferences or reparations. Perhaps Justice Blackmun believed
that racial preferences would greatly advance racial equality.
That belief is now obviously wrong. An “other way” is not only
possible but necessary, because racially discriminatory measures
will not overcome inequality.
Eschewing racial discrimination does not preclude acknowledgment of race. Since racial separation in housing and education
damages blacks,315 both government and private groups may
fairly consider race by encouraging integration. Also, since attitudes and behavior often vary by race, it makes sense to learn the
differences and to address problems in ways that take them into
account. Since many blacks suspect a conspiracy to infect them
with AIDs,316 for example, different approaches to AIDs education
may be warranted in predominantly black schools. Such efforts do
not discriminate because programs in mostly white schools would
be equally funded; they would simply use different approaches.
College programs to recruit students are another area where
racial distinctions make sense. High school students’ knowledge
about higher education varies by race even after correcting for
factors like family income and parents’ education.317 Schools may
reasonably pursue black students in ways that take these differences into account. Outreach programs targeted to black students
do not violate the rights of any individual. This is important both
because the Constitution=s guaranty of equal protection applies to
individuals, not racial groups,318 and because the protection of individuals embodied in this and other clauses of the Constitution
reflects the value afforded to individuals (as opposed to identity
groups) in western civilization and especially in America. Even if
group level discrimination is not illegal, it is divisive and should
be employed only when non-discriminatory measures will not
work.
Although programs should not be racialized, it is helpful if they
314.Bakke, 438 U.S. at 407 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
315. See Munroe, supra note 313, at 244–53.
316. See Darryl Fears, Study: Many Blacks Cite Aids Conspiracy; Prevention Efforts
Hurt, Activists Say, WAST. POST, Jan. 25, 2005, at A2.
317.
318. A[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.@ U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
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are supported by black leaders. People more readily accept decisions that they helped to make.319 Such acceptance is particularly
important when a project requires not just their acquiescence but
also their active support, as is the case with programs to improve
the education or employment of some group.
F. The Role of Government
Through the 1960s and 1970s, civil rights leaders worked to
equalize the legal and political rights of African Americans.320 The
effort largely succeeded: discrimination in voting, employment,
housing, and other areas by both government and private entities
was forbidden.321 Additional anti-discrimination laws probably
would not produce major benefits. First, anti-discrimination laws
in employment work best on large employers, for whom statistical
patterns can be shown and litigation achieves economies of scale
by handling several cases at once.322 Hence anti-discrimination
laws give a competitive advantage to smaller firms, which are
harder to sue and not covered at all by some of these laws.
Some employers diminish the bite of these laws by hiring fewer
minorities to begin with, since discrimination in hiring is harder
to prove than discrimination in firing or promotion.323 Some employers simply locate facilities where few minorities live.324 Others use independent contractors, who often are not covered by
discrimination laws, instead of employees.325 Enactment and en-

319. See Brockner & Siegel, supra note 58, at 391; The Logic of Reciprocity, supra note
43, at 20 (stating that negotiations with communities promote their acceptance of government actions).
320. See generally JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED
BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1994) (chronicling the
civil rights movement).
321.
322. See Jane Howard-Martin, A Critical Analysis of Judicial Opinions in Professional
Employment Discrimination Cases, 26 HOW. L.J. 723, 727 (1983).
323. See Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, The Unintended Consequences of the ‘91 Civil
Rights Act, REG., Summer 2003, 42, 47 (concluding that because of the 1991 Act, “employers with higher susceptibility to employment discrimination litigation reduced their hiring
of protected workers”).
324. Richard D. Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmation Action, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1037,
1072–73 (1996) (indicating that incentive programs are used to lure business to economically depressed areas).
325. These avoidance tactics do not mean that these employers are racially biased. A
racially homogeneous workforce may be more profitable. See supra note 117. Also, litigation is expensive even if the employer is ultimately exonerated. Unbiased employers may
take steps to minimize minority employment to avoid these costs. See Oyer & Schaefer,
supra note 323, at 47.
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forcement of anti-discrimination laws may also backfire by conveying the impression that discrimination is more common than
it actually is, thereby erroneously increasing resentment among
minorities and suggesting to whites that discrimination is socially
(if not legally) acceptable.326
Anti-discrimination laws still play a positive role. They not
only prevent and remedy discrimination but also signal, through
the expressive function of law, that our society cares about minorities and condemns racial bias. The potential of antidiscrimination laws is limited, though. To make major progress
toward racial harmony and equality, we must look elsewhere.
VI. POSSIBLE STEPS
The primary purpose of this article is not to propose programs
to reduce racial inequality, but to show how principles of trust
can facilitate such programs. However, it may be useful to identify some helpful steps. These measures will not appeal to all and
do not comprise a total agenda. Again, though, a national consensus is unnecessary, many of these steps can be taken by state or
local governments or private groups. Although they are limited,
cooperation on these steps could raise interracial trust: AThe joint
solution of conflict can enhance and deepen trust, in several
ways.@327 Increased trust can dispel pessimism and trigger positive norm cascades and so ignite a virtuous cycle of improved behavior and interracial cooperation. The measures entail both concrete programs and the expressive function of law.
A. Social Welfare Measures
Anti-poverty measures disproportionately benefit blacks,328 but
are new programs politically viable now? Even the Clinton Administration tightened standards for welfare programs329 and the
George W. Bush Administration has extended these efforts.330
Still, much can be done. First, projects by state and local governments and private groups are possible. Second, even the present

326. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
327. NOOTEBOOM, supra note 24, at 93.
328. See supra notes 112–15 and accompanying text (documenting economic inequality
of African Americans).
329.
330.
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administration supports some social welfare programs through
faith-based initiatives.331 President Bush and many other Republicans acknowledge a religious duty to help the needy.332 Since religion and churches are so strong among American minorities,
blacks can join Hispanics and other minorities, Republicans, and
many Democrats to urge action to discharge that duty. It helps
that many religious minority leaders share the preference of conservatives for programs that seek to improve the conduct of recipients.
1. Trade in Racial Preferences
Beneficial programs could be enacted in exchange for a trade-in
of racial preferences. Until recently, a trade-in might have been
dismissed by conservatives hoping that the Supreme Court would
soon forbid them anyway. The Court=s recent rulings dispel that
hope,333 but they also impose conditions that make racial preferences even less valuable than before to blacks. Thus, a trade-in is
now more attractive for both sides. Blacks in Congress will not
readily accept a trade-in; they are politically wedded to preferences and to the black elite that most benefits from them. Almost
all have safe seats and are more concerned with increasing their
influence in the Democratic Party than with striking deals with
Republicans. Blacks outside of Congress lack these conflicting interests and could discuss a trade-in. Such a deal would boost the
popularity of the President and Republicans with minorities
while pleasing conservatives by ending preferences.
Preferences could be ended by amending the Civil Rights Acts
to make explicit what was intended when they were enacted: forbidding racial discrimination by agencies of state, local, and federal governments (including state colleges and universities), by
private recipients of government money (including firms that receive government contracts and private colleges and universities
that receive government money), and businesses engaged in interstate commerce.334

331. See Thomas W. Ross, The Faith-Based Initiative: Anti-Poverty or Anti-Poor?, 9
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 167, 167–71 (2002).
332. See id. at 167.
333. See, e.g., Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, Colo., 540 U.S.
1027, 1027 (2003) (denying a petition for review of Denver’s use of preferences in awarding
public construction contracts).
334. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–2000h-6 (2000 & Supp. I 2001).
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2. Education and Job Training
Increased education raises incomes.335 Pell Grants, the core
federal program for poor college students, once covered eightyfour percent of the cost of a four-year public university; they now
cover only forty-two percent.336 Raising Pell Grants would enable
thousands more African Americans to get a college education,
which benefits not only themselves, their families, and their
communities, but also the entire nation by increasing overall productivity and reducing social pathology. Racial preferences, by
contrast, do not increase black enrollments at all since those who
receive such preferences would attend college anyway.
Cooperation could also expand choice in education. Most blacks
support voucher and charter school programs that give parents a
choice of school.337 Political conservatives and many other white
and minority parents also support these initiatives.338 Unfortunately, politics have blocked these options at the national level.339
Blacks in Congress oppose them, probably because teacher unions
are a juggernaut in the Democratic Party.340 Most Republican legislators also ignore school choice because their suburban constituents are content with their public schools and alternatives
would draw off students, thereby reducing economies of scale in
the public schools.341 By contrast, many African Americans consider their schools inadequate.342 Vouchers and charter schools
would not eliminate economies of scale in large cities, and black
students profit from these choices.343 It may, therefore, be possible

335. See Lynn A. Karoly, Investing in the Future: Reducing Poverty Through Human
Capital Investments, in UNDERSTANDING POVERTY 314–56 (Sheldon H. Danziger & Robert
H. Haveman eds., 2001).
336. See France & Symonds, supra note 262, at 30; Editorial, Punishing the Pell Grant
Program, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2003, at A24.
337. See Clint Bolick, Schools That Work for Minority Students, in BEYOND THE COLOR
LINE, supra note 110, at 277, 285–86 (reporting results of several polls).
338. See, e.g., James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of Schol Choice,
111 YALE L.J. 2043, 2051 n.23 (2002).
339. See id. at 2079.
340. See id. at 2082.
341. See id.
342. See generally Bolick, supra note 337, at 277, 278–81 (describing problems of predominantly African American public schools).
343. See Jay P. Greene & Marcus A. Winters, Competition Passes the Test, EDUC. NEXT,
Summer 2004, at 66, 68–69 (finding that vouchers improved public school performance in
Florida); Paul E. Peterson & William G. Howell, Efficiency, Bias, and Classification
Schemes: Estimating Private-School Impacts on Test Scores in the New York City Voucher
Experiment, AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST (forthcoming) (stating that “108 out of 120 separate
estimates indicate that attendance at a private school had significantly positive effects on
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to enact voucher plans limited to urban areas or to low income
families.344 Given the hostility of Democrats and the indifference
of Republicans to vouchers at the national level,345 local programs
are more plausible for now.
More effort should be made to urge black students toward careers in business. That is where the money is. Blacks thrive in
many fields, especially entertainment, sports, and politics, but
few do so in business.346 Increasing the number of successful black
business people would promote economic equality and counter
stereotypes that blacks are less capable than whites in some areas. Increasing interracial commerce would also improve race relations. ADoing business with people, even at a distance, usually
involves acknowledging their humanity.@347
All schools should be required to set high standards for all students, and parents should be exhorted to help their children meet
these standards.348 Like other measures recommended here, this
one would not be limited to blacks and would probably benefit
more whites; however, blacks would reap a disproportionate
share of the benefits because of the current racial achievement
gap in education. Many schools produce good academic results
with students of disadvantaged backgrounds.349 A large fraction of
these are charter or private schools, but some are just well run
public schools.350 All of these schools insist on order, discipline,

African Americans= test scores”); Greg Winter, Charter Schools Succeed in Improving Test
Scores, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2003, at A24.
344. See Ryan & Heise, supra note 338, at 2047.
345. See supra note 339–41 and accompanying text.
346. See FLOYD H. FLAKE & M. ELAINE MCCOLLINS FLAKE, PRACTICAL VIRTUES:
EVERYDAY VALUES AND DEVOTIONS FOR AFRICAN AMERICAN FAMILIES xv–xvi (2003) (arguing that adulation of hip-hop celebrities and athletes has been particularly damaging to
black youth by eroding traditional African American morals); Brent Staples, Editorial,
Broken Hoop Dreams for the Basketball Players of Coney Island, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2004,
§ 4, at 10 (describing the deceptive lure of professional sports to the detriment of education
among young blacks).
347. Robert Wright, Editorial, Two Years Later, a Thousand Years Ago, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 11, 2003, at A25.
348. Rigor of curriculum and parent participation are two important elements of educational achievement and of the current Aachievement gap@ between black and white students. See Educational Testing Service, Parsing the Achievement Gap: Baselines for Tracking Progress 8-9, 20-21 (2003) [hereinafter Parsing the Achievement Gap]; see also ZOCH,
supra note 248, at 198 (arguing that American schools need to demand more of students of
all colors).
349. See ABIGAIL THERNSTROM & STEPHAN THERNSTROM, NO EXCUSES: CLOSING THE
RACIAL GAP IN LEARNING 43 (2003).
350. See id. at 43–44.
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testing, parental involvement, and high student performance.351
Those whose education still leaves them suboptimally employed should have access to good job training, which is another
win-win measure for blacks and whites.352
3. Tax Relief for Low Income Workers
Another fertile field for interracial agreement is tax relief for
low income workers. Welfare reform freed many people from dependence on government handouts, but the newly employed—and
many other low wage workers—remain in or near poverty.353 Although they pay no federal income taxes, they face heavy Social
Security charges and state and local taxes.354 Lowering their
taxes would pay three dividends. It would raise incentives to get
off welfare and stay off. Most beneficiaries will quickly spend the
added income, thereby stimulating economic demand. And this
boost will be concentrated in minority neighborhoods that especially need it.
A further step is to expand the Earned Income Tax Credit
(AEITC@).
A parent earning $10,000 a year can qualify for as much as $4,000 a
year in tax refunds. This is the equivalent of turning a $6-an-hour
job into an $8.40-an-hour job. Unlike an increase in the minimum
wage, it doesn=t affect employers= labor costs and hence their willingness to hire low-skilled workers. And it has a powerful record of
encouraging work.355

351. See id. at 39–40, 47–49, 55–60, 69–70; see also Parsing the Achievement Gap, supra note 348, at 18–19 (finding that school safety is an important element of student
achievement and of the current Aachievement gap@ between African American and white
students).
352. See Holzer & Offner, supra note 133, at 83–84 (suggesting that low-come men
should have access to job training).
353. See supra notes 312–13 and accompanying text.
354. See, e.g., Jonathan Chait, For Richer; Conservatives v. Capitalism, NEW REPUBLIC,
Oct. 29, 2001, at 15.
355. Isabel V. Sawhill, The Behavioral Aspects of Poverty, PUB. INT., Fall 2003, at 79,
92; see also Holzer & Offner, supra note 133, at 83 (advocating an expanded EITC). Another advantage of raising the EITC rather than the minimum wage is that much of the
latter goes to workers who are not poor, like middle-class teenagers working to make extra
spending money.
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4. Criminal Laws
Blacks and whites should cooperate to reform criminal laws.
Minorities, especially blacks, have been devastated by the huge
number of criminal convictions and incarcerations, especially in
the “war on drugs.”356 Many minority neighborhoods have been
ruined by drugs and the crime that attends their sale and use;357
we must not accept this. The war on drugs, however, has failed; it
does not reduce drug abuse or even raise the street price of
drugs.358 Simply releasing jailed drug offenders would wreak
more havoc on already ravaged neighborhoods. This danger can
be reduced by freeing only prisoners less likely to commit crimes
and then subjecting those released to rehabilitation and careful
monitoring.
No such program can be perfect; many participants will relapse, but the net effect will be positive. Criminal conviction and
imprisonment of black men are now so common that they have
lost their stigma in the black communities and even to some extent become normative; to many, an initial arrest and conviction
are not a disgrace but a rite of passage.359 Long sentences for
mere possession or small sales of drugs diminish respect for law
among the many people who consider these sentences unjust.360
Reducing arrests and incarceration would improve respect for law
and relations with police in minority communities.
Whites would also benefit from these steps. Many whites also
incur excessive and counterproductive criminal sentences. The
high cost of prisons is straining state budgets.361 Some states are
reacting by lowering prison populations with early release pro-

356. See Thomas Adcock, Old-Fashioned Politics; Attorneys/Candidates Discover a
Winning Strategy in Door-to-Door Democratic Campaigns, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 8, 2004, at 16
(describing a district attorney candidate who campaigned on the idea that drug laws have
an unfair impact on minorities).
357. See Stephen Ohlemacher, Proposals Target Sentencing Bias, HARTFORD COURANT,
Apr. 6, 1999, at A3 (noting the disparate impact of illegal drugs and crime on minority
neighborhoods).
358. See generally Adcock, supra note 356 (noting politician’s belief in the ineffectiveness of drug laws).
359. See LOURY, supra note 141, at 80–81, 201 fig.19 (reporting that the incarceration
rate for black males is seven times that of white males).
360. Angela P. Harris, Criminal Justice as Environmental Justice, 1 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 1, 30 (1997) (stating that “the extremely high number of neighborhood men under
the control of the criminal justice system itself can reduce respect for the law”).
361. See Fox Butterfield, With Cash Tight, States Reassess Long Jail Terms, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2003, at A1.
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grams.362
5. Immigration
America is inundated with unskilled immigrants who compete
for jobs with unskilled natives.363 The impact is evident in the response of blacks, who are fleeing regions of high immigration.364
The claim that unskilled immigrants take only jobs that natives
do not want365 is debunked by economist Robert Kuttner: Afunny
thing—when employers pay decently, American workers wait in
line all night to apply.@366 Reducing immigration would not only
provide jobs for many natives who would otherwise be unemployed, but would also put upward pressure on wages for the lowskilled. These workers would benefit further if given tax relief so
that they could take home more of their wages.367
Cheap immigrant labor keeps prices down.368 Immigrant work-

362. See Editorial, Creating the Next Crime Wave, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2004, at A16
(AIn recent years, 25 states have eased sentencing policies and reinstated early release and
treatment programs for drug offenders, now about a quarter of the nation=s prisoners.@);
Adam Liptak, Sentences Are Too Long or Too Short. Rarely, Just Right, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
24, 2003, § 4, at 3 (ASeveral financially strapped states . . . have eased sentencing laws in
the past year.@).
363. See GEORGE J. BORJAS, HEAVEN=S DOOR: IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE AMERICAN
ECONOMY 19–20, 66–67 (1999); STEVEN A. CAMAROTA, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES,
IMMIGRATION FROM MEXICO: ASSESSING THE IMPACT ON THE UNITED STATES 21-23, 27-28
(2001); Roger O. Crockett, Why Are Latinos Leading Blacks in the Job Market?, BUS. WK.,
Mar. 15, 2004, at 70, 70 (quoting Reverend Jesse Jackson saying that many Latinos “‘are
hired to do work that blacks once had’”).
364. This migration is logicalBwhile median household incomes generally rose during
the 1990s, they fell in areas of high immigration. See Peter Y. Hong, The U.S. Census:
Data Reflects California=s Highs, Lows, L.A. TIMES, June 5, 2002, at B1; Scott Martelle &
Erin Chan, Income Drop in >90s Cut a Broad Swath, Data Show, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27,
2002, at B1; Janny Scott, Census Finds Rising Tide, and Many Who Missed Boat, N.Y.
TIMES, June 17, 2002, at B1; Janny Scott, Manhattanites Fared Best in New York City in
1990s, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2002, at B4. Ironically, many go to the old Confederacy.
Vernon M. Briggs, Jr., Editorial, Immigration Policy Sends Blacks Back to South, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 1990, at A22.
365. See Jean Baldwin Grossman, The Substitutability of Natives and Immigrants in
Production, 64 REV. ECON. & STAT. 596, 602 (1982) (stating that the influx of immigration
does not seriously affect natives); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NEW AMERICANS:
ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND FISCAL EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION 218 (James P. Smith &
Barry Edmonston eds., 1997).
366. Robert Kuttner, Bush=s Cynical Immigration Gambit, BUS. WK., Feb. 9, 2004, at
20.
367. See supra notes 353–55 and accompanying text.
368. See Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Who Left the Door Open?, Time, Sept. 20,
2004, at 52 (“Many citizens quietly benefit from the flood of illegals because the supply of
cheap labor helps keep down the cost of many goods and services . . . .”).
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ers are also more docile because they fear that any trouble will
lead to their deportation, especially if they are here illegally.369
Competition from immigrants intimidates native workers who
might otherwise be more assertive.370 The benefits of immigrant
labor are outweighed, though, by its costs. In areas of high immigration, local governments are overwhelmed by the added cost of
social services and law enforcement.371 Increased unemployment
and lower incomes of natives also create social costs.372
Politicians of both parties hesitate to restrict immigration both
because of donations from employers of immigrants and for fear
of offending voters from ethnic groups with many immigrants.
Black politicians share this reluctance. Like their hostility to
school vouchers, it stems partly from concern for their standing in
the Democratic Party. However, most Americans want to reduce
immigration.373 Private groups and sympathetic politicians in
both races should publicize this issue and pressure the federal
government to act.
6. Encouraging Charity
One problem with government social welfare programs is that
they diminish donations to private charities.374 Also, cuts in the
highest federal income tax rates reduce the tax benefits of charitable donations by the wealthy, who are the largest donors.375
Those concerned about the needy should support government action to encourage private charity.

369. Further, Aemployers—some of whom are nonwhite themselves—say they find inner-city employees [who are largely Black] to be unreliable.@ Mead, supra note 222, at 65.
370. Ryan D. Frei, Comment, Reforming U.S. Immigration Policy in an Era of Latin
American Immigration: The Logic Inherent in Accommodating the Inevitable, 39 U. RICH.
L. REV. ___ (2005).
371. See ROY BECK, THE CASE AGAINST IMMIGRATION: THE MORAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL,
AND ENVIRONMENTAL REASONS FOR REDUCING U.S. IMMIGRATION BACK TO TRADITIONAL
LEVELS 203 (1996); Eric Bailey & Dan Morain, Anti-Immigration Bills Flood Legislature,
L.A. TIMES, May 3, 1993, at A3.
372. See BECK, supra note 371, at 203–04.
373. See Stephen Dinan, Americans Oppose Increase in Immigration, WASH. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 2004, at A1.
374. See A. Abigail Payne, Does the Government Crowd-Out Private Donations? New
Evidence from a Sample of Non-Profit Firms, 69 J. PUB. ECON. 323, 324–25, 343 (1998);
Richard Steinberg, Does Government Spending Crowd-Out Donations?: Interpreting the
Evidence, 62 ANNALS PUB. & COOP. ECON. 591, 591 (1991). But see Cagla Okten & Burton
A. Weisbrod, Determinants of Donations in Private Nonprofit Markets, 75 J. PUB. ECON.
255, 268, 271 (2000);
375. See, e.g., Evelyn Brody, Charities in Tax Reform: Threats to Subsidies Overt and
Covert, 66 TENN. L. REV. 687, 694 (1999).
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The proposed Charity Aid, Recovery, and Empowerment
(“CARE”) Act of 2003 was approved by the Senate on April 9,
2003, and was introduced in the House of Representatives.376 It
would increase the tax incentives for much charitable giving.377
One problem with private charity is that much of it goes to activities that give little or no aid to the needy.378 Many of these activities (the arts, for instance) are worthy, but the poor need more
help, and the disproportionate number of blacks among the needy
strengthens the case for action. Federal, state, and local governments should give better tax treatment to philanthropy for the
poor. The expressive function of government should also be used
to promote philanthropy simply by publicizing the efforts and accomplishments of charities for the poor.
B. The Expressive Function of Law
If race relations were rational, there would be no problem to
discuss—all groups benefit from cooperation and trust. Sadly,
race relations often provoke irrational emotions. Racial harmony
is also hindered by subgroups that profit from racial separation
and strife. The government influences race relations by affecting
not just people=s material interests, but also their attitudes
through its expressive function.379 Despite extensive (and often
justified) skepticism about government in America today, the
prestige of the law remains high. Thus, opposing groups battle
fiercely about whether the Confederate flag will fly over the
South Carolina state house380 and about the Supreme Court=s disposition of criminal sodomy laws that are almost never enforced.381 These controversies entail few material consequences,
but the results can significantly alter public opinion.
The effects of the expressive function of government are slight

376. Charity Aid, Recovery, and Empowerment Act of 2003, S. 272, 108th Cong. (2003)
377. See Scott M. Michelman, Faith-Based Initiatives, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 475, 475
n.8 (2002).
378. See Michael M. Burns, Fearing the Mirror: Responding to Beggars in a “Kinder
and Gentler” America, 19 HUSTINGS CONST. L.Q. 783, 802 (1992).
379. See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.
380. See Jim Davenport, S.C. Removes Rebel Flag from Statehouse, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE (West Virginia), July 2, 2000, at A8; Rick Freeman, S. Carolina’s Allegiance to
the Flag; State is a Sports Outcast Because of Confederate Link, WASH. POST, May 20,
2000, at D1.
381. See Melanie C. Falco, The Road Not Taken: Using the Eighth Amendment to Strike
Down Criminal Punishment for Engaging in Consensual Sexual Acts, 82 N.C. L. REV. 723,
723–24, 752 (2004); Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by
“Unenforced” Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. L.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 103–04 (2000).
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when people=s beliefs are firmly entrenched, but much greater in
areas like race where beliefs are ambivalent, amorphous, and
volatile.382 Government=s expressive influence is greatest in national institutions, especially the presidency, Congress, and the
federal courts, but local governments can also play a role. The
Republican Party could be especially influential. In most elections, the majority of whites vote Republican,383 so blacks realize
that Democrats, even a Democratic president, do not speak for
most white Americans. A commitment to racial equality from Republicans would indicate a general consensus among whites.
Government can improve race relations by simply teaching
that everyone benefits from racial trust and cooperation. Most
people do not instinctively grasp this truth; fear and suspicion of
others seems to be more natural, especially with racial groups
that look different.384 Fear and suspicion are abetted by the related misconception that human relations are zero sum games so
that any gain by one group must come at the expense of others.
Government can counter this error by proclaiming the opportunity for mutually profitable, win-win results from collaboration.
By its expressive function, government also influences
norms.385 Again, moral suasion is most effective not when it attacks deeply held norms, but when it shows people that one of
their norms conflicts with another norm that they value more
highly. The abolitionists persuaded most Americans that their
Christian faith demanded liberty for all, including slaves, and
that their own forefathers had so proclaimed in the Declaration of
Independence.386 Today, government can inculcate not just tolerance but respect and care for other groups by reminding us that,
like the Good Samaritan, we are our brother=s keeper.387
No particular plan is required for this purpose; care and respect can be shown in many ways. Some manifestations can be
purely expressive, as in statements and personal gestures of
friendship and concern. Such statements are rightly dismissed as
empty rhetoric, though, unless backed by concrete acts. Govern-

382. See supra text accompanying notes 145–49.
383. JAMES M. GLASER, RACE, CAMPAIGN POLITICS, AND THE REALIGNMENT IN THE
SOUTH 9 (1996).
384. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
385. See supra notes 88–96 and accompanying text.
386. See Michael Kent Curtis, The Courious History of Attempts to Suppress Antislavery Speech, Press, and Petition in 1835–37, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 785, 798–99 (1995); see also
supra note 222 and accompanying text.
387. See supra note 209.
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ment leaders do not enhance trust if they profess concern about
education for African Americans but take no action while opposing racial preferences in schools.
Race relations are affected not only by attitudes about race per
se but by the attitudes of the prosperous to the needy. Many
whites harbor no bias against blacks but do little on their own to
help the poor and generally oppose such help from government.388
Because the poor are disproportionately black,389 many African
Americans suspect these whites of racism. The suspicion may be
mostly wrong, but given the history of race in America, it is to be
expected. Even if they believe denials of racial prejudice, many
poor Americans, white as well as black, resent refusals of the
comfortable to help them.390
Here again the expressive power of government can be decisive.
Most people=s attitudes about the poor are mutable.391 They are
influenced, inter alia, by the expected effectiveness of the help,
the level of contributions by others, and the merit of recipients.392
Thus, in addition to promoting government aid to the poor, government leaders can publicize successes achieved through private
charity and the cooperation of the recipients.
People are also motivated by ideals, this includes “visions about
what the future could bring if only the dispute that confronts
them can be surmounted.”393 Many politicians are loathe to proclaim ideals; the first President Bush scoffed at the “vision
thing.”394 Optimism also collides with the fatalism about race propounded by people like Derrick Bell and a broader skepticism
about human behavior that now seems pervasive in America.395
But Judaism and Christianity project visions of universal brotherhood and of a society transfigured by concern for the needy.

388. See Amy L. Chua, The Paradox of Free Market Democracy: Rethinking Development Policy, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 287, 320 (2000).
389. See Reginald Leamon Robinson, The Other Against Itself”: Deconstructing the Violent Discourse Between Korean and African Americans, 67 CAL. L. REV. 15, 78–79 (1993);
supra notes 238 and accompanying text.
390. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
391. See Michelle S. Jacobs, Full Legal Representation for the Poor: The Clash Between
Lawyer Values and Client Worthiless, 44 HOW. L. J. 257, 298–99 (2001).
392. See supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text.
393. Raiffa, supra note 283, at 140.
394. See Mary McGrory, Faint-Hearted Phrasemakers, WASH. POST, July 24, 1988, at
C1.
395. See generally JEDEDIAH PURDY, FOR COMMON THINGS: IRONY, TRUST, AND
COMMITMENT IN AMERICA TODAY xi–xv, 38–39 (1999) (describing and decrying the skepticism).
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America, more than any other nation, was founded on a vision of
liberty, the Apursuit of happiness,@396 and Aa more perfect Union@
that would Apromote the general Welfare.@397 To envision a better
world is as American as apple pie, and high government officials
can use their prestige to inspire us to strive for that vision. Such
efforts not only influence many people directly but can also precipitate a “norm cascade” that sweeps up others.398
Some so-called conservatives deny that social progress is possible,399 but the Judeo-Christian principles embraced by most conservatives forbid such despair, and the success of America itself
empirically refutes it.400 The vision of racial harmony and equality is also appealing because it entails the practical as well as the
idealistic—all Americans would gain from it. Thus leaders should
not stress the sacrifices necessary to achieve this vision, although
the task will be expensive and emotionally difficult; such messages are not well received in our self-centered, materialistic age.
Rather they should stress material profits to be earned in the future and the honor, pride, and satisfaction to be gained now.
Pursuit of common goals can be thwarted by subgroup interests.401 Republicans may hesitate to increase Pell Grants because
much of the benefit would go to people who would not vote for
them anyway. Instead, they would prefer to cut taxes or provide
benefits for their own supporters. On the other side, blacks in
Congress hesitate to trade in racial preferences or to cooperate
with Republicans because some of their influential constituents
benefit from preferences and because cooperation would boost
Republicans at the expense of Democrats.
It would be naive merely to exhort politicians to reject special
interests and serve the common good. As public choice theory
shows, government officials are normal humans—they generally
pursue their own interests by favoring those who can elect, hire,
promote, or fire them.402 Like others, public officials sometimes
rise above self-interest and act altruistically, especially if the
costs to them are low. However, altruism alone is unlikely to ef-

396. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
397. U.S. CONST., pmbl.
398. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
399. See John L. Hill, Note, Freedom, Determinism, and the Externalization of Responsibility in the Law: A Philosophical Analysis, 76 GEO. L.J. 2045, 2069 & n.95 (1988).
400. See supra notes 167–69.
401. See generally discussion supra Part II.A.
402. For an explanation of public choice theory, see Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice in
Perspective, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE 1, 3–8 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997).
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fect major change on important issues. A more promising path is
for citizens concerned about the poor to exert political pressure
that makes it profitable for government officials to address their
concerns. Since new, powerful grass roots movements are rare, it
is more likely that existing institutions could change their agendas to apply more of the desired pressure on government.
CONCLUSION
Racial inequality remains America=s biggest problem. The disadvantaged state of so many African Americans is not only unjust
but also costly to whites. In recent decades, progress in narrowing
this disparity has slowed to a crawl. This inertia is especially
frustrating because there are many helpful steps on which most
Americans can agree. These measures are not taken because mistrust between the races thwarts collaboration. Techniques for reducing suspicion and building trust have been identified and applied in many contexts, including some local efforts at racial
cooperation. This Article has discussed these techniques and
shown how they could be used to break out of the current stalemate and achieve real progress toward equality.

